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The commercial success or failure of engineered systems has always been significantly 
affected by their interactions with competing designs, end users, and regulatory bodies. Designs 
which deliver too little performance, have too high a cost, or are deemed unsafe or harmful will 
inevitably be overcome by competing designs which better meet the needs of customers and 
society as a whole. Recent efforts to address these issues have led to techniques such as design 
for customers or design for market systems. 
In this dissertation, we seek to utilize a game theory framework in order to directly 
incorporate the effect of these interactions into a design optimization problem which seeks to 
maximize designer profitability. This approach allows designers to consider the effects of 
uncertainty both from traditional design variabilities as well as uncertain future market 
conditions and the effect of customers and competitors acting as dynamic decision makers. 
Additionally, we develop techniques for modeling and understanding the nature of these 
complex interactions from observed data by utilizing causal models. Finally, we examine the 
complex effects of safety on design by examining the history of federal regulation on the 
transportation industry. 
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These efforts lead to several key findings; first, by considering the effect of interactions 
designers may choose vastly different design concepts than would otherwise be considered. This 
is demonstrated through several case studies with applications to the design of commercial 
transport aircraft. Secondly, we develop a novel method for selecting causal models which 
allows designers to gauge the level of confidence in their understanding of stakeholder 
interactions, including uncertainty in the impact of potential design changes. Finally, we 
demonstrate through our review of regulations and other safety improvements that the demand 
for safety improvement is not simply related to ratio of dollars spent to lives saved; instead the 
level of personal responsibility and the nature and scale of potential safety concerns are found to 
have causal influence on the demand for increased safety in the form of new regulations.
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Le succès ou l'échec commercial des systèmes complexes (e.g. avions de transport 
commercial) ne dépend pas que de la qualité technique intrinsèque du produit mais 
il est aussi notablement affectée par les différentes interactions avec les autres 
acteurs du milieu tels la concurrence, les utilisateurs finaux et les organismes de 
réglementation. Des produits qui manquent de performances, ont un coût trop 
élevé, ou sont considérées comme dangereux ou nuisibles seront inévitablement 
surmontés par des produits concurrents qui répondent mieux aux besoins des 
clients et de la société dans son ensemble.  
Dans cette thèse, nous cherchons à utiliser le cadre de la théorie des jeux afin 
d'intégrer directement l'effet de ces interactions dans un problème d'optimisation 
de conception qui vise à maximiser la rentabilité du concepteur du système. Cette 
approche permet aux concepteurs de prendre en considération les effets de 
l'incertitude venant d’une part des sources traditionnelles de variabilités 
(propriétés matériaux, tolérances géométriques, etc) ainsi que d’autres incertitudes 
de nature non technique reflétant par exemple l’incertitude du futur marché ou les 
interactions avec les autres parties prenantes (nouveaux produits concurrents, 
nouvelles règlementations, etc). Dans ce cadre nous développons également des 
techniques de modélisation utilisant des modèles causaux afin de comprendre la 
nature d’interactions complexes à partir des données observées. Enfin, nous 
examinons les effets complexes entre sureté de fonctionnement et conception en 
examinant l'histoire de la réglementation fédérale sur l'industrie du transport. 
Ces travaux ont mené à plusieurs résultats clés. D'abord, en considérant l'effet des 
interactions entre les différents acteurs, les concepteurs peuvent être amenés à 
faire des choix techniques très différents de ceux qu’ils auraient fait sans 
considérer ces interactions. Cela est illustré sur plusieurs études de cas avec des 
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applications à la conception d'avions de transport commercial. Deuxièmement, 
nous avons développé une nouvelle méthode de construction de modèles causaux 
qui permet aux concepteurs d'évaluer le niveau de confiance dans leur 
compréhension des interactions entre les différents acteurs. Enfin, nous avons 
montré par une étude liens entre la réglementation et les améliorations de la sureté 
que la demande pour l'amélioration de la sureté ne répond pas toujours à une 
rationalité économique. En revanche la demande  pour plus de sureté est fortement 
influencée par des facteurs tels que le niveau de responsabilité personnelle et la 
nature et ampleur des accidents potentiels.  
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 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
French Chapter Summary 
L'objectif de cette thèse est de développer un cadre permettant aux concepteurs de 
modéliser et de tenir compte au cours du processus de prise de décision des interactions 
complexes entre les acteurs multiples mis en jeu. Le cadre de la théorie des jeux sera utilisé afin 
d'apporter des informations sur ces interactions directement dans la fonction objectif d'un 
concepteur. Les effets de la prise en compte de ces interactions sera analysé sur des exemples 
numériques simples ainsi que des problèmes réalistes en phase de développement conceptuel 
d’un système complexe. Ces interactions étant difficiles à modéliser et prédire, des méthodes 
seront développées pour quantifier les interactions majeures basées sur des données historiques 
grâce à l'utilisation de modèles causaux. La robustesse, la précision, et l’estimation des 
incertitude de ces modèles seront analysées afin d'assurer leur utilité pour les prises de décision 
au cours de la conception. Nous étudierons enfin comment la question complexe de la sureté de 
fonctionnement est actuellement considéré dans le domaine des transports et explorerons les 
facteurs jouant le rôle le plus important. Cette analyse permettra de construire de meilleurs 
modèles pour représenter la valeur de la sureté vis-à-vis des différents types de risques présents 
dans les systèmes de transport. 
Motivation 
An important part of many modern design problems is understanding how uncertainties 
like variability in material properties, unknown operating conditions, or design tolerances will 
impact the performance and reliability of the final design. An equally important but often 
overlooked form of uncertainty is the way competing designs, customer preferences, and market 
changes affect design value or profitability as a function of system cost, reliability, and 
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performance. For example, the value of a new, more fuel efficient airliner will depend on 
demand for air travel, future fuel prices, and the performance of other available aircraft. The goal 
of this work is to provide design decision makers with the tools to account for these interactions, 
to generate models of important interactions, and to predict the effects of complex ideas like 
safety on design value. 
While designers have long been aware of these sorts of economic uncertainties, 
understanding the complex ways in which these factors affect design has proven difficult. 
Previous works such as Vincent [1], Rao [2], Badhrinath and Rao [3], and Lewis and Mistree [4] 
have demonstrated the use of game theory for solving multidisciplinary design problems, but 
have not addressed the application of game theory to economic uncertainty and interactions. Li 
and Azarm study the design of a product [5] or product family [6] in the presence of competitive 
products in the market and uncertain customer preferences, but do not model customers or 
competitors as dynamic decision makers. Subrahmanyam [7] also considers the idea of market 
uncertainties as affecting design optimality, but these uncertainties are taken as stochastic values 
and are not affected by design decisions. Morrison [8] applies game theory to a case study of fuel 
efficiency innovation among competing airlines, but does not consider additional stakeholders or 
applications to design optimization. Other important contributions include the foundational ideas 
of decision based design [9] and value driven design [10] as tools for explaining design value as 
a function of performance attributes. 
Understanding the way these interactions occur in real life systems poses an additional 
challenge. Little existing research attempts to meaningfully quantify the real world relationship 
between design decisions and performance with design value. While this relationship is a 
foundational consideration of value driven design [10] as well as other design methods, the value 
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functions are typically based on simple assumptions about customer preferences and market 
conditions with no consideration about how design changes might affect customer behavior or 
competitive products. One tool for measuring these relationships is causal models [11], which 
have been utilized in economics, health science, and political science as well as engineering 
applications. Causal models are based on a Bayesian networks framework and have found some 
applications in engineering cost modeling [12] as well as the area of maintenance prognostics 
[13]. Methods for fitting causal models generally rely on a score and search criteria and include 
the Peter and Clark (PC) algorithm [14], the Spirtes-Glymour-Scheines (SGS) algorithm [15], the 
Inductive Causation (IC) algorithm [16], and the Sparsest Permutation (SP) algorithm [17] for 
non-temporal data and methods such as the Time Series Causal Model (TSCM) algorithm [18] 
for temporal data. One factor lacking from many of the existing methods is a quantification of 
the uncertainty in causal model parameters and predictions, which are critically important for 
making informed decisions during design. 
The importance of safety and risk in design, particularly in the area of aviation and 
transportation, should not be overlooked. One may gain understanding of the relationship 
between safety and design by considering the way safety improvements are analyzed with 
respect to their cost. Several significant prior works have examined the way the cost 
effectiveness of safety improvements is determined in various fields. Viscusi and Aldy [19] 
provide a detailed overview of various factors affecting the applied value of statistical life. 
Morrall [20] and Tengs et al. [21] both provide reviews of the cost effectiveness of previously 
implemented or proposed life-saving measures across many different fields. Cropper and Portney 
[22] outline some of the difficulties faced by regulators and policy makers in attempting to 
quantify cost effectiveness for new safety measures. Hammitt and Graham [23] outline the 
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difficulty in assessing survey respondents’ willingness to pay for safety, particularly in the case 
of highly unlikely events. Arrow et al. [24] provide a discussion of the ways in which cost-
benefit analysis can and should be used to shape public policy. 
Objective 
The objective of this research is to develop a method which allows designers to model 
and account for complex interactions between multiple stakeholders during the decision making 
process. A game theory framework will be utilized in order to bring information about 
interactions directly into a designer’s objective function. The effects of considering these actions 
on simple numerical examples as well as realistic conceptual design problems will be considered. 
Since these interactions are difficult to model and predict, methods will be developed for 
quantifying important interaction effects based on historical data through the use of causal 
models. The robustness, accuracy, and uncertainty estimates of these models will be tested in 
order to ensure their usefulness for design decision makers. We will study how the complex issue 
of safety is currently considered in economic analysis and explore some of the important factors 
related to the treatment of safety in existing transportation systems. This analysis will allow for 
better constructs for representing the value of safety as it compares to certain types of risk in 
transportation systems. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 details the methodology 
developed to account for interactions between multiple stakeholders using game theory and some 
accompanying example problems and case studies. Chapter 3 describes the use of causal models 
for quantifying models of interactions between stakeholders, procedures for fitting causal models 
from observed data, and quantification of model confidence and parameter uncertainty including 
applications to real world data. Chapter 4 discusses the difficulty in assigning monetary value to 
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system safety through a cost-effectiveness review of transport regulations and corrective actions 
over the past decade. Chapter 5 provides a summary of the work with overall conclusions and 
suggestions for further investigation.
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   CHAPTER 2
DESIGN OPTIMIZATION WITH STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
French Chapter Summary 
De nombreux systèmes complexes mettent aujourd’hui en jeu différentes parties 
prenantes, où chaque acteur interagit de manière spécifique avec les autres parties. Dans le cas le 
plus simple, il n’y a que deux acteurs : un concepteur qui détermine les caractéristiques du 
système et un client qui détermine la façon d'utiliser le système. Dans le cas des systèmes plus 
complexes, nous pourrions avoir également des opérateurs du système, des régulateurs, et des 
fournisseurs. Nous pouvons en outre avoir de multiples acteurs au sein de chacun de ces groupes 
en concurrence les uns avec les autre, par exemple il y a typiquement plusieurs concepteurs 
cherchant chacun à satisfaire un besoin du marché avec des produits similaires mais légèrement 
différents. Chacun de ces acteurs agit comme un décideur dynamique, agissant et réagissant sur 
la base des décisions prises par d'autres parties prenantes. Ces types d'interactions peuvent être 
déterminantes sur le succès ou l'échec d'un produit, plus encore que ses qualités techniques 
intrinsèques. 
Il existe actuellement plusieurs méthodes que des concepteurs peuvent utiliser pour tenter 
de comprendre ces interactions, la plupart du temps en essayant de découvrir les préférences des 
autres acteurs. Le plus souvent, les concepteurs utilisent des données historiques relatives au 
succès ou l’échec de différents types de systèmes développés dans le passé. Un concepteur peut 
également communiquer directement ou indirectement avec les autres acteurs, par exemple à 
travers une étude de marché, pour tenter de déterminer l'importance relative de différents 
indicateurs de performance. Cependant, ces méthodes ne sont pas exactes, et la compréhension 
des préférences des autres parties prenantes auront ainsi erreur. Cela peut être dû à un biais 
d'échantillonnage de modèles existants, à l’extrapolation dans un nouvel espace de conception, 
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ou en cas de communication directe, une mauvaise communication des préférences, soit par 
l'ignorance d'une partie prenante de leurs propres préférences ou d'une tentative délibérée 
d'influencer les décisions des concepteurs. Nous pouvons considérer ces erreurs dans la 
compréhension des préférences des autres acteurs comme une incertitude de nature économique 
au sens large, modifiant directement la fonction objectif d'un concepteur et affectant donc les 
choix fait au travers du processus d'optimisation de la conception. 
Afin de comprendre les effets des interactions entre ces différents acteurs, nous 
proposons d’utiliser la théorie des jeux. La théorie des jeux a été développé en économie comme 
un moyen de modéliser la prise de décisions stratégiques entre acteurs rationnels, nommés 
joueurs. Selon la façon dont les joueurs interagissent et l'information partagée entre eux, nous 
pouvons arriver pour un même problème de base à des résultats très différents. En ce qui 
concerne le problème d'optimisation de la conception d’un système, la théorie des jeux nous 
permet de mettre à jour de manière adaptative la fonction objective à optimiser, basé sur notre 
position de départ dans l'espace de conception, les changements dans le marché, et les actions 
des autres parties prenantes, considérés comme des joueurs ici. Dans ce chapitre nous 
reformulons un problème d'optimisation multidisciplinaire en conception préliminaire avion pour 
tenir compte des interactions dynamiques entre différentes parties prenantes en utilisant un 
modèle de la théorie des jeux avec des interactions simultanées ou séquentielles. Nous montrons, 
sur cet exemple aéronautique, l’importance de considérer ces interactions dans cette phase de 
conception qui permet de mieux rendre compte des différents compris à faire. Nous analysons 
également une situation dans laquelle le concepteur intègre dans l’optimisation un marché futur 
incertain ainsi que d’autres incertitudes de nature économique. Les résultats montrent que ces 
incertitudes ont un impact très important sur les choix effectués, bien plus que les incertitudes 
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traditionnelles, de nature non-économiques qui sont habituellement considérés en conception 
robuste. 
Overview 
Many modern engineered systems involve multiple stakeholders, each providing some 
inputs and receiving some outputs with respect to the system. In the simplest case, this might be 
a designer who determines system characteristics and a customer who determines how to utilize 
the system. In more complex systems, we might also have system operators, regulators, or 
suppliers. We may additionally have multiple stakeholders within each of these groups 
competing with one another, for example multiple designers each providing similar products to 
their customers. Each of these stakeholders acts as a dynamic decision maker, acting and reacting 
based on the decisions made by other stakeholders. These types of interactions can have a 
dramatic effect on the success or failure of a design. 
There are several methods designers currently use to attempt to understand these 
interactions, mostly by attempting to uncover the preferences of other stakeholders. Most 
frequently, designers use legacy information based on the types of designs they and their 
competitors have produced before and the success of those designs. A designer may also use 
direct communication with other stakeholders, such as via a market study, to attempt to 
determine the relative importance of different performance metrics. However, these methods are 
not exact, and the resulting understanding of stakeholder preferences will have some error. This 
may be due to sampling bias of legacy designs, extrapolation into a new design space, or in cases 
of direct communication, miscommunication of preferences, either through a stakeholder’s 
ignorance of their own preferences or a deliberate attempt to sway the designers’ decisions. We 
can consider these errors in understanding stakeholder preferences as an economic uncertainty, 
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directly changing a designer’s true objective function and therefore affecting the design 
optimization process. 
In order to understand the effects of these stakeholder interactions, we can utilize game 
theory [25]. Game theory has been developed in economics as a way to model strategic decision 
making between rational stakeholders, or players. Depending on the way players interact and the 
information shared between them, we can arrive at different outcomes for the same basic design 
problem. From the perspective of our optimization problem, game theory allows us to adaptively 
update our objective function, relating the performance characteristics of our design to designer 
profits, based on our location in the design space, changes in the market, and actions of other 
stakeholders. We will introduce this idea in more detail with some simple examples in the next 
section. 
As discussed in the introduction, several prior works have utilized game theory 
frameworks to look at aspects of design optimization. However, the authors are not aware of any 
existing attempts to develop a combined framework to consider dynamic decision making of 
customers and competitors while also considering uncertain future markets.  The objective of this 
chapter is to reformulate a multidisciplinary design optimization problem to account for dynamic 
interactions between multiple stakeholders and market changes using a game theory model with 
both simultaneous and sequential interactions considered.  We will additionally demonstrate, 
using simple examples from the aerospace industry, why considering these interactions during 
design optimization is important, and how it provides a designer with more information about 
design trade-offs.  
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Methodology for Formulating Optimization to Include Interactions 
Formulation of optimization considering interactions 
For the purpose of this dissertation, we will focus on how we can reformulate an 
optimization problem when considering the effects of the interactions between l stakeholders. 
Readers interested in the principles of game theory can find more information from introductory 
game theory text books such as Fudenberg and Tirole [25]. First, let us consider a basic 
multidisciplinary design optimization problem formulation: 
 ���௑ ∑�࢏ࢌ࢏ሺࢄሻ࢔࢏=૚   ݏ. ݐ. ݃௝ሺࢄሻ ൒ Ͳ ݂݋ݎ ݆ = ͳ,… ,݉ ( 2-1 ሻ 
where X is our vector of design variables, ௜݂ describes the ith performance metric of the design, ݓ௜ is the weight of the ith performance metric in the optimization, and ݃௝ describes the jth of m 
many design constraints. 
By varying the vector � in this optimization, we can calculate a set of Pareto optimal 
designs with a different set of performance attributes, ܹ as specified by the performance 
equations ௜݂ሺܺሻ.  
 ܹ = [ ଵ݂ሺܺሻ,… , ௡݂ሺܺሻ] ( 2-2 ) 
Now consider that for each design and set of performance values (that is, each weight 
vector w) we can define some profit function for our designer,  
 �૚ሺࢃ, ࢅ, �ሻ ( 2-3 ሻ 
 
where � describes the decision vector of the other stakeholders in the design and ܧ describes a 
set of exogenous variables not directly controlled by any stakeholders. This function is used to 
transform our design performance and other stakeholder decisions directly into the profit for the 
designer.   
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The decision vector � will be determined by the other stakeholders attempting to 
maximize their own expected profits, such that 
 ࢅ࢑ = ��g���௒ೖ �࢑ሺࢅ࢑,ࢃ, ࢅ~࢑, �ሻ  ݂݋ݎ ݇ = ͳ,… , ݈ ( 2-4 ሻ 
where Π௞ describes the profit of the kth stakeholder, �� is the decision vector of the kth out of l 
many stakeholders, and �~� is the decision vector of the remaining ݈ − ͳ stakeholders 
We now have ݈ + ͳ profit functions and ݈ + ͳ decision sets. This can be thought of as l+1 
different optimization problems, each dependent on the same decision vector for all players, 
forming an over determined set of equations. In order to determine a solution, we must apply a 
set of rules; in our case this is based on a certain game structure that describes the amount of 
information shared between stakeholders and the order in which decisions are made. Information 
shared between stakeholders refers to how well each stakeholder is able to approximate the profit 
functions of the others. For example, a designer may not explicitly know the profit function of 
their customer, but may make an approximation based on prior designs. We will also show that 
there situations may arise where one stakeholder may have an incentive to deliberately mislead 
another stakeholder in order to create a more favorable situation for themselves. This type of 
behavior need not be detrimental for the stakeholder being misled, and can in some cases be 
advantageous for both parties. 
The order of decisions may be either simultaneous, sequential, or partially both. 
Sequential decision making means one stakeholder chooses their decision vector first and passes 
that decision on to the next stakeholder in the sequence. Stakeholders moving first will 
approximate the reaction of each subsequent stakeholder based on their available information 
about those stakeholders’ profit functions. These approximated reactions are known as a best 
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reply function [25]; that is, given that stakeholder one chooses ଵܻ, stakeholder 2 will maximize 
their expected profit by playing ଶܻ, or simply 
 ࢅ࢏ = �࢏࢐ሺࢅ࢐, ࢅ̂ሻ ( 2-5 ሻ 
where �௜௝ is the best reply function that relates the given ௝ܻ to the best reply ௜ܻ and ܻ̂ is the 
vector of decisions of all the other stakeholders, some of which may be known based on the 
sequence of the game, and others which require their own best reply function to determine. Each 
of these can be solved recursively to determine a best reply function for each subsequent 
decision maker. 
We can therefore formulate our profit maximization problem for the designer by 
combining equations ( 2-1 ), ( 2-3 ), and ( 2-5 ), where the decisions of stakeholder acting in 
sequence before the designer are given as inputs, and the best reply function for stakeholders 
acting after the designer act as constraints. This problem will be subject to uncertainty in the 
exogenous inputs, �, as well as uncertainty due to approximations made in determining the best 
reply function, �. 
 ݉ܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁ �ଵሺࢃ, ࢅ, �ሻ 
( 2-6 ሻ  ࢄ = ��g���௑ ∑�࢏ࢌ࢏ሺࢄሻ࢔࢏=૚   ܹ = [ ଵ݂ሺܺሻ,… , ௡݂ሺܺሻ] 
 ࢙. ࢚. ࢍ࢐ሺࢄሻ ൒ ૙ ࢌ࢕࢘ ࢐ = ૚,… ,࢓  
 ࢅ࢑ = �௞ଵሺࢃ, ࢅ~࢑ሻ ݂݋ݎ ݇ = ʹ,… , ݈ 
In the case of simultaneous decisions, we must use the concept of Nash equilibrium [25] 
to determine a solution. A Nash equilibrium is a point in the decision space where no stakeholder 
can improve their own profit function by changing their decision vector. This means that a Nash 
equilibrium acts as a self-enforcing agreement between the players. That is to say, ሺܺ, ܻሻ is a 
Nash equilibrium if and only if 
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 �૚ሺࢃ, ࢅ, �ሻ > �૚ሺࢃכ, ࢅ, �ሻ ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ ࢃכ ≠ ࢃ, ܽ݊݀ ( 2-7 ሻ 
 �௞ሺࢅ࢑,ࢃ, ࢅ~࢑, �ሻ > �௞ሺࢅ࢑כ ,ࢃ, ࢅ~࢑, �ሻ ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ ࢅ࢑כ ≠ ࢅ࢑ , ݇ = ʹ,… , ݈ 
We can find any pure strategy Nash equilibria by formulating a best reply function for 
each stakeholder and solving that system of equations to determine where all the best replies 
intersect. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium means a stakeholder plays a single deterministic 
decision vector, while a mixed strategy means a stakeholder randomly selects from multiple pure 
strategies with some predetermined probability of each. It should be noted that there is no 
guarantee of a single unique Nash equilibrium, and equilibria can exist in both pure and mixed 
strategies. To solve our problem using simultaneous decision making, we are no longer 
performing an optimization. Instead, we are looking for the intersection of the surfaces defined 
by the best reply functions for each of our stakeholders. These intersections represent pure 
strategy equilibria, of which there may be multiple or none. In cases of multiple Nash equilibria, 
we can sometimes eliminate some equilibrium through so called refinements. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, we will present all Nash equilibria as possible outcomes, and we will only deal 
with simultaneous decision making in the discrete decision context for simplicity. 
Numerical Example Problem 
Having defined how we may formulate an optimization problem considering interactions 
with other stakeholders, let us consider a simple example based only on stakeholder profits 
without considering a design problem. We have two stakeholders, an aircraft manufacturer who 
specifies the design and their customer the airline. Both are monopolists, meaning they face no 
competition. We assume that the designer leases aircraft to the airline at a per flight cost that is 
fixed, regardless of the aircraft design or the number of flights. 
The designer’s only decision variable is the level of technology to invest in the aircraft, ܶ. This can be thought of as the design effort and material and labor cost associated with 
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producing the aircraft. For our problem, we will consider ܶ  to be bounded between 0 and 1. T 
acts as the only weighting variable w as described in equation ( 2-1 ), where a value of 0 is the 
optimal manufacturing cost, and a value of 1 is the optimal customer value.  
The airline’s decision variable is the number of flights that they will offer, ܳ, which will 
determine the price they charge per ticket based on a fixed linear demand for air travel. The 
airline has some fixed cost of operation per flight, some cost that is proportional to the price of 
jet fuel, ܿ�, and some benefit based on the level of technology invested in the aircraft. We can 
then formulate the profit functions for both stakeholders as follows 
 �ௗሺܶ, ܳሻ = ܳሺܮ − ்ܿܶሻ ( 2-8 ሻ 
 �௔ሺܶ, ܳ, ܿ�ሻ = ܳሺܲሺܳሻ ௣ܰ − ܿ�ܨ − ܿ�ܮ + ݒ்ܶሻ ( 2-9 ሻ 
where ்ܿ is the cost to implement new technology for the designer, ܨ is the fuel consumption per 
flight, ܮ is the lease cost per flight, ܿ� is some factor greater than 1 describing the total fixed 
costs for the airline including lease cost, ݒ் is the value of technology to the airline, ௣ܰ is the 
number of passengers per flight, and ܲሺܳሻ is the price per ticket based on the linear demand 
function, given by 
 ܲሺܳሻ = ܽ − ܾܳ ௣ܰ ( 2-10 ሻ 
To create a meaningful example, we first find some reasonable estimates for some of the 
unknown coefficients in our problem. We select a Boeing 737-700 as the baseline aircraft for our 
analysis. Considering the standard configuration capacity of 128 passengers [26] and an average 
load factor of roughly 0.8 [27], we take the number of passengers per flight, ௣ܰ, as 100. Given an 
average flight length of 1000 miles [27], we calculate the fuel consumption per flight,  ܨ , as 
roughly 1500 gallons [28]. Average recent jet fuel prices are around $3.00 per gallon [29], and 
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we consider a range up to $5.00 to account for possible future changes. Based on the 737-700 list 
price of $76M [30] and a useful life of 60,000 flights [31] we find a per flight cost of $1,300. 
Considering additional storage and maintenance costs as roughly doubling this expense, we 
select the per flight lease cost of the aircraft, ܮ, as $3000. Based on available airfare cost 
breakdown data [32], we consider that ܿ� ranges from 10 to 12, meaning that the capital cost of 
the aircraft ranges from 8% to 10% of the total cost per flight, depending on the airline. In order 
to determine characteristic numbers for the cost and value of new technology, we consider a new 
aircraft design project. We consider that this new design will cost an additional $850 per flight, 
roughly a 25% increase from the initial design, and provides a benefit of $4200 per flight 
through increased capacity, efficiency, and passenger comfort. Finally, by collecting data on 
tickets sold and average ticket price over the past 20 years, we fit the linear relationship between 
quantity and price as shown in Figure 2-1. This approximation assumes that the airline uses this 
single aircraft design to service all of their routes. 
Now let us consider the simplest case of interaction, where the designer first decides on 
the level of technology investment with full information about the airline profit function, and the 
airline then determines the quantity of flights in a sequential game. Note that both profit 
functions, equations ( 2-8 ) and ( 2-9 ), are concave functions. We can therefore calculate a best 
reply function for the airline by setting to zero the first derivative of the airline profit function 
with respect to Q and solving for Q, such that 
 ݀�௔݀ܳ = ݒ்ܶ − ܿ�ܮ − ܿ�ܨ + ௣ܰ(ܽ − ܾ ௣ܰܳ൯ − ௣ܰଶܾܳ 
 
( 2-11 ሻ 
 ܳכ = �ௗ௔ሺܶሻ = ܽ ௣ܰ + ݒ்ܶ − ܿ�ܨ − ܿ�ܮʹܾ ௣ܰଶ  ( 2-12 ሻ 
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We can substitute this best reply function into the designer’s profit function to replace ܳ 
and solve for the designer’s optimal value of T by setting to zero the derivative of the designer’s 
profit function with respect to ܶ and solving for T, 
 ݀�ௗ݀ܶ = ݒ்ሺܮ − ்ܿܶሻ + ்ܿሺܿ�ܨ + ܿ�ܮ − ܽ ௣ܰ − ݒ்ܶሻʹ ௣ܰଶܾ  
 
( 2-13 ሻ 
 ܶכ = ݒ்ܮ + ܿ�்ܿܨ + ܿ�்ܿܮ − ்ܽܿ ௣ܰʹ்ܿݒ்  ( 2-14 ሻ 
Using our values for our various coefficients, we can calculate the decision of the 
designer and airline and the profit for each. Since we have ranges of values for fuel price and the 
airline cost factor, we perform this analysis at the 4 extreme cases of these coefficients as shown 
in Table 2-1. Because our problem is linear in these values, we can interpolate between these 4 
points to find the decisions and profits at any combination.  Note that in the first case, the 
designer would choose an optimal value of slightly negative technology investment, however we 
restrict this value to be between 0 and 1. It can be seen that the optimal decisions and resulting 
profits for both the designer and airline vary greatly with these possible changes in parameters ܿ� 
and ܿ�. 
In a realistic design problem, we will likely consider that a designer must make design 
decisions without knowledge of future fuel prices. These prices will be unknown to the airline as 
well. A designer will then maximize expected profits based on the possible distribution of future 
fuel prices. Due to the simple linear nature of our example problem, this will be the same as 
designing based on the mean value of future fuel prices. 
A designer may face additional uncertainty in their understanding of the airlines’ profit 
function, for example in the value of ܿ�. However, the airline will be able to know this value 
exactly. This is known in game theory as a game of “incomplete information” [25]. This means 
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the designer will face some error in their prediction of the best reply function of the designer, 
specifically 
 ܳכ = �ௗ௔~ ሺܶሻ = ܽ ௣ܰ + ݒ்ܶ − ܿ�ܨ − ሺܿ� + ߝሻܮʹܾ ௣ܰଶ  ( 2-15 ) 
where ߝ describes the error in the designers estimation of airline costs due to insufficient 
information or changes in ܿ� over the time lag between the designer and airline decisions. 
We can see from our previous example that the designer will invest more in technology if 
they believe the airlines fixed cost, ܿ�, is higher. This is because higher fixed costs mean the 
effect of technology on airline marginal profits is more significant, and therefore more 
technology investment will have a greater effect on the quantity of flights. This relationship 
implies that airlines will have an incentive to mislead designers into believing that their costs are 
higher than in reality, shifting profits away from designers and toward airlines. Without 
considering the effects of these interactions, designers will be unable to understand the effects of 
these potential uncertainties. 
To explore these interactions in more detail, let us switch from a continuous game to a 
discrete one. In this case, the designer must either decide to invest in new technology (ܶ = ͳ) or 
not (ܶ = Ͳ). The airline will decide whether to expand their market by offering a higher number 
of flights (ܳ = ʹ.ͷܯ), or to maintain their current levels (ܳ = ͳ.ͷܯ). We consider that fuel 
prices will either be $3 per gallon with probability ݌� or $5 per gallon with probability ͳ − ݌�. 
Finally, the designer assumes the airline is a low cost carrier (ܿ� = ͳͲ) with probability ݌� or a 
high cost carrier (ܿ� = ͳʹ) with probability ͳ − ݌�. We can express this problem using a 
decision tree, known in game theory as an extensive form game [25]. 
In the figure, each node represents a decision, and dashed lines between nodes indicate an 
information set, where the decision maker must act without knowing for certain which node in 
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the information set they are currently in. The solution will therefore depend on the decision 
maker’s beliefs about the values of ݌� and ݌�. The payoffs for each resulting set of decisions are 
given at the end of each path, where the top number is the designer’s profit, and the bottom 
number is the airline’s profit, both in billions of dollars. We can simplify this game by 
eliminating dominated strategies for the airline, since we know at the last branch of the decision 
tree the airline will choose the value that maximizes their own profits; this is known as 
backwards induction. Figure 2-3 shows these dominated strategies in gray. 
We see that, based on this discrete example, the designer can only influence the airline to 
utilize more flights by increasing technology investment if fuel prices are low and airline costs 
are high, or fuel prices are high and costs are low. In the remaining two cases, the designer will 
strictly prefer not to invest in new technology, since they will lease the same number of flights 
regardless and will have a higher profit margin for each. Airlines will always prefer the case 
where designers invest in technology, as they always gain higher profits. 
From this simple example, we would conclude that if fuel prices are high, airlines will 
attempt to convince designers that they have low costs, as designers will believe they can then 
influence flight quantity by investing in technology. If fuel prices are low, airlines will attempt to 
convince designers that their costs are high, again in an effort to encourage designers to invest in 
technology. 
We may also be interested to know if the possible solutions of this game change if we 
consider that designers and airline make decision simultaneously. For example, airlines submit 
orders for new aircraft without knowing future fuel prices or precise aircraft specifications. We 
can represent this sort of game using strategic form, with 4 payoff matrices representing the 4 
possible combinations of fuel price and airline costs as shown in Figure 2-4. 
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The numbers in each box represent the payoffs for the airline and the designer, 
respectively. Numbers that are underlined indicate a best reply for that stakeholder. When both 
numbers are underlined in the same box, meaning the best replies intersect, we have a Nash 
equilibrium for that individual game, represented by circling that square. We can see that for the 
simple game we have constructed, it is never advantageous for the designer to invest in 
technology. This happens because since decisions are made at the same time, the designer’s 
choice cannot influence the quantity selected by the airline. We can also see that when airline 
costs are high (ܿ� = ͳʹ), meaning we are on the two matrices on the right side, the equilibrium 
solution for this game will be (ܶ = Ͳ), (ܳ = ͳ.ͷܯ). When airline costs are low, the equilibrium 
will depend on the probability of low fuel prices, ݌�, as the airline will attempt to maximize their 
expected profits. If the airline believes ݌� is less than 0.11, they will always choose the low 
quantity (ܳ = ͳ.ͷܯ), and if they believe ݌� is greater than 0.11 the airline will choose the high 
quantity, (ܳ = ʹ.ͷܯ). When ݌� is equal to 0.11, the airline is indifferent between these two 
strategies and may play either one, or play a mixed strategy where they randomly select between 
both options. It should be noted that the designer would strictly prefer the airline select the 
higher quantity, but based on this game structure, they have no way to influence that decision. 
It should be noted that the solutions we have found for each of these different types of 
games need not be Pareto optimal in terms of profits for both stakeholders. For example, in 
Figure 2-4, we can see that both the designer and a high cost airline (ܿ� = ͳʹ) would be strictly 
better off playing the strategy (ܶ = ͳ), (ܳ = ʹ.ͷܯ) as compared to the equilibrium strategy 
(ܶ = Ͳ), (ܳ = ͳ.ͷܯ), regardless of the values of fuel price and airline costs. However, that 
strategy is not an equilibrium solution because one or both of the stakeholders can improve their 
profits by modifying their decision.  For example, in the case of [ܿ� = ͷ, ܿ� = ͳʹ] starting at 
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(ܶ = ͳ), (ܳ = ʹ.ͷܯ), we see that the designer would strictly prefer to select (ܶ = Ͳ) when the 
airline plays (ܳ = ʹ.ͷܯ), and similarly the airline prefers (ܳ = ͳ.ͷܯ) against (ܶ = ͳ).  Because 
the strategies and payoffs are known, each player will realize the other will try to change their 
own strategy, and will respond accordingly, resulting in selecting (ܶ = Ͳ), (ܳ = ͳ.ͷܯ).  This is a 
variation on the classical game theory example known as the prisoner’s dilemma [25]. 
Application to Conceptual Design Optimization of an Aircraft Wing 
Design optimization frequently deals with uncertainty due to variations in material 
properties, operating conditions, and design specifications.  One often overlooked source of 
uncertainty is in the way designers determine tradeoffs between multiple objectives.  These 
tradeoffs affect the value of the design to customers, regulators, and other interested stakeholders 
in the design, which ultimately determines the profitability of the design.  However, traditional 
multi-objective design optimization rarely considers these dynamic interactions, and when it 
does it models the preferences of other stakeholders using heuristic methods. 
Aircraft design is often viewed as a characteristic multi-objective or multi-disciplinary 
problem. Aircraft design is also subject to complex relationships between stakeholders; these 
stakeholders include the airlines who buy the aircraft and the passengers who buy tickets.  
Additionally, because of the large time gap between design and entire service life, changing 
market conditions can play a major role in the success or failure of a design; for instance changes 
in fuel prices or public demand for air travel. 
Designers set their objective function based on data regarding the preferences of airlines 
and the public, either learned from past experience or provided directly by these stakeholders. 
The interaction between stakeholders in the communication of these preferences is subject to 
uncertainties because stakeholders do not have perfect knowledge of their own interests now or 
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in the future, but also because it may be advantageous for them to provide misleading 
information, leading to what is known as information asymmetry. We propose to utilize game 
theory to model how each of these stakeholders will interact with one another as they make 
strategic decisions to maximize their own welfare.  In this application, we focus on quantifying 
the importance of considering these economic uncertainties relative to other sources of 
uncertainty in a characteristic problem. 
Design Problem Description 
The goal of our simple example problem is to represent a characteristic multidisciplinary 
design optimization problem using simple analytical formulas.  The problem we look at is the 
design of a commercial transport aircraft wing, which provides a mixture of structural and 
aerodynamic performance goals.  The aircraft designer specifies two configuration design 
variables: the wing aspect ratio ܣܴ and the design safety factor ܵܨ beyond what is required by 
regulations. 
The aircraft designer makes a third decision on the number of structural tests ௧ܰ௘௦௧ to 
perform which will affect the minimum acceptable knockdown factor for certification of the 
aircraft, similar to the A-basis criteria specified by the FAA [33]. Based on the probability of not 
meeting this certification criteria, the designer will be assessed some monetary penalty. 
Additionally, each test performed will have some fixed cost. This means the designer may 
choose to have higher design cost (more tests) in order to improve performance or reduce 
certification cost by allowing for a less conservative certification criteria. 
The wing is idealized using a trapezoidal shape, where sweep, planform area, and taper 
ratio are based on the dimensions of a Boeing 737-700 [34] and are constant across all designs, 
meaning that changing the aspect ratio will scale the span and chord proportionally. The wing 
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box is constrained by the wing cross-section, meaning increasing the aspect ratio will decrease 
the maximum possible design safety factor due to longer, more slender wings. 
Once these design variables are determined, a structural designer optimizes the wing box 
for minimum weight subject to constraints on stress and deflection. Details on the models used to 
estimate aerodynamic and structural characteristics of the wing are provided in Appendix A. 
This simple design problem introduces some basic tradeoffs similar to those seen in a true 
multidisciplinary design problem.  By increasing the aspect ratio, the aircraft designer can reduce 
the aircraft fuel consumption, but this change cause penalties structural weight and probability of 
failure.  The aircraft designer can reduce the probability of this design penalty either by 
increasing safety factor or increasing the number of tests performed.  These trade-offs are 
summarized in Figure 2-5. 
Reformulating Optimization 
To be able to consider interactions in optimization, we must describe how decisions are 
made among stakeholders and how information is shared between them. In this case, we will 
consider that the designer is interacting with an airline, who determines the number of aircraft to 
purchase based on the number of tickets the airline is able to sell. To deal with these interactions, 
we use common terminology and techniques utilized in game theory [25]. 
One key concept is the idea of a best reply function, which defines a player’s optimal 
strategy given the strategies of all other players. We can calculate a best reply function by taking 
the partial derivative of a player’s objective function with respect to each of their decision 
variables, setting the result to zero and solving for the optimal value of that decision variable, as 
shown in equations ( 2-16 ) and ( 2-17 ). 
 �ଶሺܺଵ, ܺଶሻ ( 2-16 ) 
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 ߲�ଶ߲ܺଶ = Ͳ ⟹ ܺଶכ = ݂ሺ ଵܺሻ ( 2-17 ) 
Second order conditions are guaranteed by the fact that any meaningful profit function 
for a player should be concave in each player’s own decision variables.  The resulting expression 
will provide the optimal value of that decision as a function of the actions of all other players. 
For our example problem, we will consider that the stakeholders play a sequential game, 
where the aircraft designer will act first to determine the nature of the aircraft available. After 
learning what the aircraft designer does, the airline will determine how many aircraft to 
purchase. In order for the aircraft designer to act first, they must estimate the best reply function 
of the airline which can then be inserted into the aircraft designer’s own profit function. In doing 
so, the aircraft designer will incorporate the uncertainties faced by the airline directly into their 
own optimization problem. 
The estimation of this best reply function may itself be subject to some error or 
uncertainty. We consider that we may have a case of asymmetric information, meaning one 
player has more available information than another. For instance in our example problem, the 
airline may know their own profit function exactly, while the aircraft designer may estimate 
some elements of the airline profit function with some error. 
It can then be determined whether or not the airline has an incentive to signal, or to 
communicate information to the aircraft designer, that would either increase or decrease the error 
of this estimation by the aircraft designer. Similarly, we can see if the designer has an incentive 
to screen, or try to gather more information from the airline about their preferences. In some 
cases, errors in the aircraft designer’s estimation of the airline’s preferences might be good for 
both players, bad for both, or might increase one player’s profit at the expense of the other. 
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Understanding the situations that give rise to these cases is an important factor in understanding 
airline and aircraft designer relations. 
Economic Interaction Model 
In order to model the interactions between aircraft designers and airlines, we must first 
develop reasonable ways to express the profits of each group.  We attempt to specify objective 
functions that capture some important trade-offs and interactions for both stakeholders without 
excessive complexity. The interactions of stakeholders with the design problem and their 
exchange of information are summarized in Figure 2-6. 
For the aircraft designer, revenues are based on the number of aircraft sold to airlines 
௔ܰ௜௥ and the price the aircraft designer decides to charge ௔ܲ௜௥.  The aircraft designer’s costs are 
based on a fixed initial cost of a new project ܥ௜௡௜, the number of tests they perform ௧ܰ௘௦௧ which 
each have a fixed cost ܥ௧௘௦௧, and the probability of a certification penalty ௣ܲ௘௡ which we assume 
will also have a fixed cost associated with making the design safety compliant ܥ௣௘௡.  The aircraft 
designer’s profit function Πௗ is then given as 
 �ௗ = ௔ܰ௜௥ ௔ܲ௜௥ − ௧ܰ௘௦௧ܥ௧௘௦௧ + ௣ܲ௘௡ܥ௣௘௡ − ܥ௜௡௜ ( 2-18 ሻ 
The airline’s revenue is based on the price ௧ܲ௜� and quantity ௧ܰ௜� of tickets sold.  We 
assume that each aircraft has a useful life of 60,000 flights with an average passenger load of 100 
passengers per flight.  Additionally, we consider that the number of aircraft is significant enough 
as to not face scheduling and route constraints.  The demand for air travel is defined using a 
simple linear demand function, such that price is determined for a given number of flights, such 
that the maximum price is ௠ܲ௔� and decreases with increasing tickets sold at a rate ௦ܲ. 
 ௧ܲ௜� = ௠ܲ௔�  − ௦ܲ ௧ܰ௜� ( 2-19 ሻ 
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Airlines have four different sources of costs; the first is based on the fuel consumption 
over the life of the aircraft given by the product of the number of flights ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧, the cost of fuel ܥ௙௨௘௟, and the aircraft fuel consumption per flight ܨܥ.  The second cost is based on the 
acquisition price of the aircraft they choose to purchase ௔ܲ௜௥.  The third cost component is a fixed 
cost ܥ௙௜� for each aircraft, based on the labor, taxes, fees, and passenger services required for 
each aircraft.  The final cost component is based on the level of safety of the aircraft being 
utilized, where the cost is equal to the product of the probability of failure ܲܨ, the number of 
passengers ௣ܰ௔�, and a penalty per life at risk; for this penalty we use the value of statistical life 
(ܸܵܮ) specified by the Department of Transportation [35]. This cost term is intended to reflect 
the increased safety and maintenance costs related to flying less safe aircraft.  Combining these 
components, the airline’s profit function Π௔ is �௔ = ௔ܰ௜௥( ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ ௣ܰ௔� ௧ܲ௜� − ௔ܲ௜௥ − ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ܥ௙௨௘௟ܨܥ − ܸܵܮ כ ௣ܰ௔�ܲܨ − ܥ௙௜�൯ ( 2-20 ሻ 
We relate the number of tickets sold and the number of aircraft purchased ௔ܰ௜௥ by 
assuming each aircraft is capable of 5 flights per day. 
 ௔ܰ௜௥ = ௧ܰ௜�ͷ כ ͵͸ͷ ௣ܰ௔� ( 2-21 ሻ 
Since we have specified a sequential game, the aircraft designer will need to estimate the 
actions of the airline using a best reply function. We can calculate the airline’s best reply 
function by taking the first derivative of their profit with respect to the number of tickets sold.  
Combining equations ( 2-19 ), ( 2-20 ), and ( 2-21 ), we can rewrite the profit function as 
 �௔ = ௧ܰ௜�ͷ כ ͵͸ͷ כ ௣ܰ௔� ( ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ ௣ܰ௔�ሺ ௠ܲ௔�  − ௦ܲ ௧ܰ௜�ሻ − ௔ܲ௜௥ − ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ܥ௙௨௘௟ܨܥ− ܸܵܮ כ ௣ܰ௔�ܲܨ − ܥ௙௜�൯ ( 2-22 ሻ 
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Taking the derivative with respect to ௧ܰ௜�, setting the result equal to zero, and solving for 
the optimal value of ௧ܰ௜� yields 
 ௧ܰ௜�כ = ͳʹ ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ ௣ܰ௔� ௦ܲ ሺ ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ ௣ܰ௔� ௠ܲ௔� − ܥ௙௜� − ௔ܲ௜௥ − ܥ௙௨௘௟ ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ܨܥ− ܸܵܮ כ ௣ܰ௔�ܲܨሻ ( 2-23 ሻ 
We may now use the best reply function to allow the aircraft designer to anticipate ௔ܰ௜௥ 
by using the relation in equation ( 2-21 ). In doing so, we have now directly incorporated 
information that previously only affected the airline, such as fuel cost and demand for air travel, 
directly into the optimization formulation for the other stakeholders. 
Problem Analysis 
Now that we have defined the formulation of the design problem and the profit functions 
for each of our stakeholders, we can calculate the profit maximizing solution for the aircraft 
designer who is anticipating the reaction of the airline.  To do this, we must first find reasonable 
estimates for some of the coefficients present in the design and profit functions.  Table 2-2 
provides a summary of these coefficients, their assumed values or a range of values; these values 
and ranges are estimated based on various sources (Aircraft characteristics [26] [27] [36] [37] 
Design requirements [38] [39] [40] Fuel prices [29] Ticket prices [41] Manufacturer costs [42] 
Airline costs [31] [32] [35] Quarterly profits [43] [44] [45] [46] ). 
Note that for eight of these variables, we have assumed a range of values.  This is either 
due to uncertainty in the true values (e.g. fixed operating cost), or actual randomness in the true 
values (e.g. yield strength.)  To understand the effect of these variations, we perform a case study 
in which we take each of these uncertainties as an interval variable.  We sample from these 
uncertain ranges in order to understand the effect of changes in these values on the optimal 
decisions made by the designer and airline.  Even though the change in profits may be 
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significant, if the optimal decisions are relatively constant with respect to variation in one of 
these coefficients, it will be reasonable to neglect it. We search over each of the interval values 
in order to find the minimum and maximum value of each of the four decisions variables 
between both stakeholders for the interaction model given in the previous section; these results 
are shown in Table 2-3. 
We see that there is a large variation in the optimal values of each of the decisions, except 
for number of tests. We also find that for some combinations of variables, the airline will elect 
not to fly at all meaning that for some combinations of parameters it is impossible for the airline 
to be profitable. The primary change for the designer comes from the aspect ratio, the optimal 
value of which varies completely between the upper and lower bounds specified in the 
optimization problem. In order to understand how much of this variation in optimal decisions is 
due to economic uncertainty, we can compare to the case where each economic variability is 
fixed and only variability in material properties remains. The results of this analysis may also be 
seen in Table 2-3. It can clearly be seen that the addition of economic uncertainties has a 
significant effect on the optimal decisions, as the range of aspect ratio and safety factor are much 
larger with economic variability included.  This change is due to the fact that the optimal number 
of tickets sold by the airline varies greatly, as one might expect when market conditions change. 
The designer then changes the type of aircraft they will construct based on the quantity they 
expect to sell, constructing cheap, low performance aircraft in poor market conditions and high 
performance high cost aircraft in favorable markets. 
To consider asymmetric information, we look at the relationship between error in the 
designer’s estimate of airline fixed costs and profits for both stakeholders across all cases of our 
other uncertainties. We find an interesting result; in some cases, both stakeholders benefit from 
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the designer underestimating the airline’s fixed costs and the designer always benefits from this 
underestimation. When the designer believes the airline fixed costs are low, they will build a 
more efficient and more expensive aircraft, as they believe airlines will have higher profit 
margins for the same number of tickets and may be willing to pay more for aircraft that can 
reduce fuel consumption. In the appropriate market conditions, (high fuel cost, high demand, or 
low fixed costs) the net effect of this change will be a reduction in the cost per flight due to 
increased fuel efficiency, leading the airline to sell more tickets at lower prices (and in turn 
buying more aircraft). This can be seen graphically in Figure 2-7 where the relative change in 
profits is presented for a variety of market conditions represented by each individual line. 
The reason that this can happen is that the designer’s decision based on the best reply 
function is not guaranteed to be Pareto optimal for either player. Were the designer allowed to 
change the design after learning the true number of aircraft purchased by the airline, they would 
choose a different design which would provide even higher profits for the designer, but lower 
profits for the airline. This is a phenomenon known as double marginalization, where two firms 
each add some profit margin to the price of a good, in this case air travel.  The net effect of this 
double marginalization is actually a reduction in profits for both firms.  When the designer has 
error in assessing airline fixed prices, they essentially reduce their own profit margin, and the 
benefits of this action are passed to the airline. In this case, the designer benefits as well due to 
the increase in aircraft sales. 
Finally, we consider an example that demonstrates some unexpected results of this study. 
It is commonly known among aircraft designers that fuel prices are an important consideration, 
and that aspect ratio can provide a trade-off between fuel consumption and increased weight (and 
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therefore increasing aircraft purchase price). Another important consideration that emerges from 
this work is the effect of consumer demand for air travel. 
We consider that the aircraft designer has already designed the optimal aircraft at the 
current level of demand for air travel where the demand curve intercept is $375; this design is 
shown in Table 2-4, Case 1. After some time, the demand for air travel drops such that the new 
intercept is $250. The aircraft designer can now choose to keep the same aircraft and update the 
price, or design a brand new aircraft; these are shown in case 2A and 2B, respectively. 
We observe a significant change in the optimal aspect ratio and safety factor for the 
redesign case, which also provides more than 60% greater aircraft design profits as compared to 
using the same design. The airline also more than doubles their profits while selling nearly50 
million more tickets each year. This occurs because the lower demand causes the airline to be 
more sensitive to aircraft prices and to buy fewer aircraft.  Taking this into account, the designer 
uses a lower aspect ratio and safety factor, sacrificing fuel efficiency and reliability for reduced 
cost. Without incorporating the effects of changes in demand into the optimization framework, 
an aircraft designer would not be aware of this potential change and might lose profits as a result. 
Effect of Forecast Uncertainty 
In commercial aviation, as with many design problems, decision makers are often faced 
with high levels of volatility in future market conditions. In order to understand the impact of 
these forecast uncertainties, we consider three sources of forecast uncertainty in our aircraft wing 
design problem: fuel price, demand for air travel (demand curve intercept), and sensitivity of 
demand to price (demand curve slope). Designers will have an estimated distribution for each of 
these variables during the conceptual design phase, as compared to the previous example where 
we considered the effect of changes in these variables which were known to the designer. For 
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this case study, we ignore variability in material properties and the effect of asymmetric 
information. 
For a proposed design concept, the designer will simulate possible future market 
conditions, airlines’ actions in this market, and resulting profits for the designer. After 
considering all possible futures, the designer will utilize a utility transformation which 
incorporates the designer’s attitude towards risk; in practice this functions as a robust design 
optimization problem. 
This example seeks to quantify the effect of various possible forecasts, as well as the 
designer’s attitude toward risk, and their effect on optimal design choices. If these design choices 
are highly sensitive to market uncertainty, designers would be well served to make additional 
effort to reduce this uncertainty by gathering extra information or by implementing a more 
flexible design process that may adapt as market conditions are revealed. 
Forecast uncertainty problem definition 
As mentioned above, we will consider three main sources of forecast uncertainty: fuel 
price ܥ௙௨௘௟, demand for air travel ௠ܲ௔�, and sensitivity of demand to price ௦ܲ. The distribution 
types and range of possible parameters for each of these variables is presented in Table 2-5. We 
will consider various cases of market forecasts based on the defined intervals for distribution 
parameters. Note that these intervals are not epistemic uncertainty, but are simply used to create 
different potential forecasts faced by the designer for our case study. Different forecasts might 
exist due to varying opinions of experts and analysts, or because one designer may have more 
information than another. By considering various sets of distribution parameters, we will see 
how changing forecast expectation and volatility result in various design choices. 
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To begin our study, we select parameter values from the intervals in Table 2-5; the values 
of these parameters are then known by the designer. For a given design concept (aspect ratio, 
safety factor, and number of tests), the designer will simulate possible future markets by 
sampling from the distributions described by those selected parameters and calculate their profits 
by combining equations ( 2-18 ) - ( 2-23 ). The designer will balance maximizing expected 
profits and minimizing risk in all possible futures through use of a utility transformation. This 
works similarly to a robust optimization problem. 
For this example, we utilize an exponential utility function, 
 
ܷ = ͳ − ݁−�Π          � ≠ Ͳ ܷ = Π                         � = Ͳ ( 2-24 ) 
This utility ܷ is a random variable since the profits Π are random. The designer will then 
maximize the expectation of this utility to arrive at a final design. This is one of the simplest 
possible utility functions, as it introduces a single parameter to define the designer’s risk 
aversion, �. This is also the coefficient of absolute risk aversion as defined by the Arrow-Pratt 
measure [25], 
 ܣሺΠሻ − ܷሺΠሻ′′ܷሺΠሻ′ = � ( 2-25 ) 
This implies that the designer’s desire to avoid risk does not change with the relative size 
of the potential profit or loss. A larger value of � indicates a designer is more conservative, while 
a negative � implies a designer who is risk seeking. When � is equal to zero, the designer is risk 
neutral and maximizing expected utility becomes equivalent to maximizing expected profits. 
A simple method by which risk aversion can be explained is the idea of a certainty 
equivalent. Consider a lottery with two equally likely potential outcomes, $0 or $200. For a risk 
neutral individual, the certainty equivalent is equal to the expected payout of the lottery, $100. 
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This is also the price the individual would be willing to pay for a ticket to this lottery. A person 
who is risk averse would only buy a ticket if the price were strictly less than $100, e.g. when � = Ͳ.Ͳͳ, the certainty equivalent is roughly $57. 
We may therefore consider different designer attitudes towards risk by adjusting the � 
parameter and maximizing expected utility. We consider a range of values from [0.01, 100], 
where profits Π are given in billions of dollars. 
Forecast uncertainty example 
In order to study this problem, we generate 128 samples of parameter values from the 6 
intervals listed in Table 2-5, as well as the interval for the designer risk aversion coefficient. This 
provides us with a 2 degree full factorial design in which we consider a high and low value for 
each parameter. These values are selected to replicate the levels of uncertainty utilized in the 
previous example described in Table 2-2 which we consider possible variability for the US 
airline market. The goal of this study is to see how the type of forecast affects design decisions; 
that is whether we have a positive or negative expectation and with low or high uncertainty. A 
flowchart of the case study process is shown in Figure 2-8. 
In each case, we carry out the design optimization specified in equation ( 2-26 ), where 
E(U) is the expected value of the utility function. 1000 possible futures are generated by Monte 
Carlo simulation from the forecast distributions specified and used to calculate the expected 
value of the utility function. The design decisions of aspect ratio, safety factor, and number of 
tests are varied and expected utility is maximized using a standard gradient based optimizer. The 
optimal design decisions for aspect ratio, safety factor, and number of tests are recorded and 
compared for each case. Table 2-6 provides the ranges of optimal decisions for the various 
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possible forecasts. Due to finite Monte Carlo samples, 90th percentile intervals are used to 
describe optimal decision values over the range of possible forecasts. 
 ����ோ,ௌ�,�೟�ೞ೟ ܧሺܷሻ ݓℎ݁ݎ݁ ܷ = ͳ − ݁−�Πd Πୢ = Nୟ୧୰Pୟ୧୰ − N୲ୣୱ୲C୲ୣୱ୲ + P୮ୣ୬C୮ୣ୬ − C୧୬୧ 
௧ܰ௜�כ = ͳʹ ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ ௣ܰ௔� ௦ܲ ሺ ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ ௣ܰ௔� ௠ܲ௔� − ܥ௙௜� − ௔ܲ௜௥ − ܥ௙௨௘௟ ௙ܰ௟௜௚ℎ௧ܨܥ− ܸܵܮ כ ௣ܰ௔�ܲܨሻ 
௔ܰ௜௥ = ௧ܰ௜�כͷ כ ͵͸ͷ ௣ܰ௔� 
( 2-26 ) 
Clearly, the impact of changing forecasts has a significant effect on the optimal decisions 
a designer will choose. Additionally, these ranges are even larger than those calculated in our 
previous work, where markets were considered to be known. Extreme values of aspect ratio 
relate strongly to mean fuel price and demand, with high aspect ratios when both are low or both 
are high and low aspect ratios when mean fuel price and demand are one low and one high. Low 
safety factors are common in many cases, but high safety factors are brought about by high 
forecast uncertainties and high mean fuel price. Low number of tests occurs in multiple 
conditions, with high number of tests resulting from low mean forecasts on all variables. 
We may additionally determine the effect of the parameters of each distribution on the 
design choices that are made. For example, if a designer’s optimal decisions are highly sensitive 
to the level of volatility in the fuel price forecast, it might be advantageous for the designer to 
attempt to either gather more data or attempt to delay their decision in order to reduce this 
uncertainty as much as possible. Table 2-7 - Table 2-9 present both the mean and standard 
deviation of optimal design decisions when facing low or high uncertainty as measured by the 
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variance of  fuel price, demand, and price sensitivity, respectively where the low and high values 
represent the extreme cases for variance in Table 2-5. In each case, all other parameters are 
varied over the ranges described in Table 2-5. 
This simple test indicates that the designer’s level of forecast uncertainty in market 
conditions can have a significant impact on their design decisions. For example, our results 
indicate that high volatility for ticket price sensitivity results in a higher optimal aspect ratio. 
This is due to the fact that when price sensitivity is high, airlines must charge low ticket prices 
and need to operate efficient aircraft to reduce their costs. By waiting some time for a better 
estimate of demand sensitivity, a designer might find that such a high performance, high cost 
design is not required. 
High forecast uncertainty in demand results in a higher aspect ratio, safety factor, and 
number of tests resulting in an overall more costly aircraft. High uncertainty in future fuel prices 
results in higher aspect ratios, lower safety factors and increased testing in order to improve 
performance in anticipation of potentially higher fuel prices. We also note that high uncertainty 
in fuel price leads to low variability in optimal aspect ratio, suggesting the aspect ratio is driven 
by the worst case (highest) fuel price considered. Overall, these results indicate design decisions 
may change significantly based on the level of forecast uncertainty. This type of analysis may be 
able to uncover situations in which designers can benefit from delaying decisions until they are 
able to reduce forecast uncertainty. 
Discussion of Results 
An example problem has been put forward that uses a basic multidisciplinary design 
problem and a simple model of economic interaction between stakeholders to investigate the 
relative importance of engineering and economic uncertainty on design decisions and outcomes.  
We have used a basic model of a wing structure and aerodynamics and simple expressions to 
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describe profit functions for aircraft designers and airlines.  Interactions between these 
stakeholders are modeled using game theory, where we have a sequential game with the aircraft 
designer moving first and asymmetric information regarding the airline’s profit function. 
We conduct a case study in which we vary the values of eight important model inputs that 
are likely to be subject to variability or uncertainty.  The range of optimal decision sets across all 
of these cases is computed and indicates that changes in market conditions can have a large 
impact in these decision values.  We find that variabilities related to market conditions and 
stakeholder profit functions have a much greater impact on design decisions and outcomes than 
traditional design variabilities such as material properties.  This finding indicates that 
understanding customer preferences and market variability is as much if not more important than 
understanding uncertainty in design parameters and operating conditions. Additionally, we show 
that designers acting with errors or limited information may actually produce a more profitable 
design for both the airline and the designer. 
 
Figure 2-1. Historical ticket price vs quantity sold [41] 
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Figure 2-2. Extensive form game with uncertainty in fuel prices specified by probability ݌� and 
in fixed cost specified by probability ݌�. Designers choose technology ܶ and airlines 
choose quantity of flights ܳ with payoffs for the designer and the airline, respectively 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Backwards induction indicating strictly dominated choices (gray) for the airline when 
choosing quantity ܳ 
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Figure 2-4. Simultaneous game solution 
 
Figure 2-5. Design problem trade-off matrix 
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Figure 2-6. Complete interactions between stakeholders and design 
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Figure 2-7. Effect of information asymmetry on airline and designer profits 
 
Figure 2-8. Forecast uncertainty case study process 
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Table 2-1. Solution values for sequential game with no uncertainty ܿ� ܿ� ܳכ ܶכ Πௗ Π௔ 
$3.00 10 2.58M 0 (-0.08) $7.75B $20.0B 
$3.00 12 2.02M 0.63 $4.99B $12.32B 
$5.00 10 2.28M 0.27 $6.30B $15.55B 
$5.00 12 1.78M 0.99 $3.83B $9.57B 
Table 2-2. Fixed coefficient values 
Coefficient Value 
Half-span 17.16 m 
Taper ratio 0.159 
Required lift 80,000 kg 
Zero lift drag coefficient 0.01 
Planform area 68 m2 
Maximum ticket price, ௠ܲ௔� $400 – $600 
Ticket demand slope, ௦ܲ 0.2 – 0.3 $ per million tickets 
Passengers per flight, ௣ܰ௔� 100 
Test cost, ܥ௧௘௦௧ $1M 
Initial design cost, ܥ௜௡௜ $30B 
Penalty cost, ܥ௥௘ $500M – $5B 
Fuel cost, ܥ௙௨௘௟ $0.53 – $1.33 per liter 
Lifetime fixed operating cost, ܥ௙௜� $780M – $900M 
Value of statistical life, ܸܵܮ $9.1M 
Yield stress 450 MPa – 550 MPa 
Elastic Modulus 65 GPa – 80 GPa 
Thrust specific fuel consumption 0.06 ݇݃ ܰ ∙ ℎݎ⁄  
Nominal wing weight 5,000 kg 
Nominal wing volume 2.0 m3 
Test limit load 3 g 
Critical deflection/span 0.25 
Designer error in ܥ௙௜� -10% – 10% 
 
 54 
Table 2-3. Range of optimal decisions 
Decision Variable Material Properties Only Including Economic Variables 
Aspect Ratio 11.5 – 14.0 7.5 – 14.0 
Safety Factor 1.17 – 1.30 1.17 – 2 
Number of Tests 10 9 – 11 
Number of Tickets 765M – 772M 0 – 3.2B 
Table 2-4. Demand shift case study 
Parameter Case 11 Case 2A2 Case 2B3 
Demand Curve 
Intercept $375  $250  $250  
Aircraft Designer 
Profits $8.08B per year $0.8B per year $1.36B per year 
Airline Profits $28.4B per year $1.7B per year $4.60B per year 
Aspect Ratio 12.28 12.28 11.68 
Design Safety 
Factor 1.38 1.38 1.27 
Number of Tests 11 11 10 
Aircraft Price $71.6M $49.3M $41.7M 
Number of Tickets 
Sold 840M per year 291M per year 339M per year 
1
 Initial optimal design with initial demand level 
2
 Initial design at new demand with updated price 
3
 New optimal design at new demand level 
Table 2-5. Definition of forecast uncertainty 
Variable Distribution Type Parameter Range 
Demand for Air Travel ௠ܲ௔� ($) Uniform � ~ [400, 600] ± ~ [25, 100] 
Sensitivity of Demand to 
Price ௦ܲ ($/million tickets) Uniform � ~ [0.2, 0.3] ± ~ [0.025, 0.05] 
Fuel Price ܥ௙௨௘௟ ($/liter) Lognormal* ܧሺܥ௙௨௘௟ሻ ~ [0.50, 3.50] ܸሺܥ௙௨௘௟ሻ ~ [0.3, 1.0] 
*Fuel prices 10th – 90th percentiles from roughly $0.50 to $5.00 per liter 
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Table 2-6. Optimal decisions with forecast uncertainty (10th – 90th Percentile Values) 
Aspect Ratio Safety Factor Number of Tests 
7.1 – 12.7 1.5 – 6.1 8 – 25 
Table 2-7. Effect of Fuel Price Forecast ሺܥ௙௨௘௟ሻ Uncertainty on Design Decisions 
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty 
Aspect Ratio Safety Factor 
Number of 
Tests Aspect Ratio 
Safety 
Factor 
Number of 
Tests 
μ: 9.06 μ: 3.36 μ: 11 μ: 9.79 μ: 2.65 μ: 13 
σ: 1.66 σ: 2.63 σ: 4.5 σ: 1.56 σ: 1.74 σ: 13.7 
Table 2-8. Effect of Demand ሺ ௠ܲ௔�ሻ Uncertainty on Design Decisions 
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty 
Aspect Ratio Safety Factor 
Number of 
Tests Aspect Ratio 
Safety 
Factor 
Number of 
Tests 
μ: 9.40 μ: 2.69 μ: 11 μ: 9.63 μ: 3.13 μ: 14 
σ: 1.62 σ: 1.82 σ: 6.6 σ: 1.64 σ: 2.38 σ: 14.2 
Table 2-9. Effect of Ticket Price Sensitivity ሺ ௦ܲሻ Uncertainty on Design Decisions 
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty 
Aspect Ratio Safety Factor 
Number of 
Tests Aspect Ratio 
Safety 
Factor 
Number of 
Tests 
μ: 9.34 μ: 2.86 μ: 14 μ: 9.70 μ: 2.97 μ: 11 
σ: 1.47 σ: 2.17 σ: 15.1 σ: 1.77 σ: 2.10 σ: 4.7 
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 CHAPTER 3
QUANTIFYING STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS FROM OBSERVATIONAL DATA 
USING CAUSAL MODELS 
French Chapter Summary 
Comprendre et prévoir les relations entre différentes variables est d'un intérêt majeur dans 
de nombreux domaines tels que l'économie, la santé ou l’ingénierie. Dans le cadre de cette thèse 
de tels modèles permettent de rendre compte des interactions entre différentes partiers prenantes. 
Les modèles causaux sont un outil qui permet d'estimer les relations de cause à effet entre 
variables allant au délà de simples effets de corrélation tels que ceux dont rends compte la 
régression. Les modèles causaux sont généralement représentés par les réseaux bayésiens, ou 
graphiquement comme un graphe acyclique orienté. Nous examinons dans ce chapitre diverses 
méthodes d'estimation de ces modèles causaux à partir des données observées et nous 
développons une nouvelle approche pour la construction de modèles causaux sur des séries 
chronologiques. Une métrique est également développé pour quantifier le niveau de confiance 
dans un modèle ajusté sur la base du nombre de fois que la même structure de modèle est 
sélectionné par un algorithme de re-échantillonnage; nous dénommons cette métrique la 
robustesse du modèle. Nous montrons par des exemples numériques que le niveau de robustesse 
est un indicateur utile de la précision d'un modèle donné; que le taux de récupération du modèle 
correct et la précision des paramètres estimés est améliorée lorsque la métrique de robustesse est 
élevée. En outre, le calcul de la robustesse fournit des estimations de l'erreur standard pour les 
paramètres des modèles estimation qui est représentative de l'incertitude des paramètres. Ces 
approches sont d’abord testées sur des exemples simples puis appliquées à deux bases de 
données réelles : la relation entre salaires et prix dans l’économie américaine d’un part, le 
marché de l'aviation commerciale aux États-Unis d’autre part. Dans les deux cas le modèle 
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construit a une robustesse relativement faible dû au manque de données plus fréquentes, mais les 
modèles permettent néanmoins de quantifier des grandes tendances dans ces interactions. 
Overview 
Understanding relationships between multiple variables and predicting the effects of 
manipulations of variables are of key interest in many fields such as economics, health sciences, 
and engineering. Causal models are a tool that allows for estimation of the cause and effect 
relationships between variables that are not described by correlation based methods such as 
regression. Pearl [11] provides a thorough overview of the concepts and challenges of causality 
and identifying causal models. Causal models are generally represented by Bayesian networks, 
or graphically as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) as shown in Figure 3-1 where ݂ represents a 
probability density function. In this case, conditional dependencies between variables in the 
network, represented by directed arrows in the DAG, can be interpreted as causal effects between 
variables. 
Joint Normal Causal Model Definition 
We will focus on the case of joint normally distributed data with linear causal effects, 
such that for multivariate time series data with ݊ variables and ܶ observations as shown in 
equation ( 3-1 ), we may represent a causal model as the vector autoregressive process for any 
arbitrary time ݐ as defined in equation ( 3-2 ).  
 ݔ௧ = [ݔଵ௧ڭݔ௡௧]  ݂݋ݎ ݐ = ͳ, … , ܶ ( 3-1 ) 
 ܣ଴்ݔ௧ + ܣଵ்ݔ௧−ଵ + ڮ+ ܣ௣்ݔ௧−௣ = ߳௧ ( 3-2 ) 
where ܣ଴ represents a matrix of the contemporaneous causal effects, ܣ௞ represents a matrix of 
the temporal causal effects at time lag ݇ = ͳ,… , ݌, respectively, and ߳௧ represents the residual 
error in the observed data at any arbitrary time ݐ. Note that to avoid cycles in the model, there 
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must exist a permutation of the matrix ܣ଴ such that the matrix becomes triangular with ones 
along the main diagonal. 
We may consider the matrix form of the causal model described in equation ( 3-2 ) as 
shown in equation ( 3-3 ).  
 ܣ்ܺ௧,௣ = [  
 ܣ଴் Ͳ ڮ Ͳܣଵ் ܣ଴் ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ Ͳܣ௣் ڮ ܣଵ் ܣ଴்]  
 ܺ௧,௣ = ൮߳௧−௣ڭ߳௧−ଵ߳௧ )  ݂݋ݎ ݌ + ͳ ൑ ݐ ൑ ܶ ( 3-3 ) 
where ܺ௧,௣ is defined as a vector of the observed data as described in equation ( 3-4 ). 
 ܺ௧,௣ = [ݔ௧−௣ڭݔ௧ ] ݂݋ݎ ݌ + ͳ ൑ ݐ ൑ ܶ ( 3-4 ) 
Assuming we have a stationary process, meaning that the mean and covariance of the 
data do not change over time, the causal relationships for any vector ܺ௧,௣, ݌ + ͳ ൑ ݐ ൑ ܶ will be 
equivalent. 
Methods for Fitting Causal Models 
Causal effects are often estimated through use of experiments where causal hypotheses 
can be directly tested [11]. However in many cases, experimentally manipulating variables is not 
feasible; for these cases many methods have been developed for learning causal models based on 
observational data. Methods for fitting causal models include the Peter and Clark (PC) algorithm 
[14], the Spirtes-Glymour-Scheines (SGS) algorithm [15], the Inductive Causation (IC) 
algorithm [16], and the Sparsest Permutation (SP) algorithm [17] for non-temporal data and 
methods such as the Time Series Causal Model (TSCM) algorithm [18] for temporal data. 
Time Series Causal Model (TSCM) Method 
One simple score based criteria for fitting causal models is proposed by Chen and 
Chihying [18]; we refer to this method as the time series causal model (TSCM) method. The 
TSCM approach utilizes stepwise process. First, an unconstrained (fully connected) vector 
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autoregression (VAR) model is fit via a multivariate least squares regression to the observed data 
in order to estimate model residuals, ߳. These model residuals are used to “learn” the structure of 
the contemporaneous effect matrix ܣ଴, where the coefficients within the matrix are calculated 
using a linear recursive simultaneous equation model (SEM),  
 
 
( 3-5 ) 
or in equivalent matrix form, 
 
 
( 3-6 ) 
For a given model structure, i.e. the active coefficients ௝ܽ௞ in a model, the matrix ܣ଴ is 
assigned a score using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) as shown in equation ( 3-7 ). 
 ܤ�ܥ = ∑݈݋݃(�ሺߝ௜ሻ൯௜ − ͳʹ l�gሺ݊௢௕௦ሻ ݂݀  ( 3-7 ) 
where φ is the standard joint normal probability density function, ߝ௜ is the model residual at the 
ith observation for the given matrix as calculated in equation ( 3-6 ),  nobs is the number of 
observations, and df is the degrees of freedom, or the combined number of nonzero elements in 
each A matrix. 
The matrix ܣ଴ is then optimized by starting with a random model structure and searching 
over all nearest neighbors by adding, removing, or reversing ( ௝ܽ௞ → ܽ௞௝ሻ one connection. The 
neighbor with the highest BIC score then becomes the updated model, and this process is 
repeated until no improvement is possible or some iteration limit is reached. This can be done 
with multiple random starting structures in order to improve the chance of finding the global 
optimum model structure. 
ݔ௝ = ∑ ௝ܽ௞ݔ௞ + ߝ௝௝−ଵ௞=ଵ    
ܣ଴ܺ = ߝ 
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In the next step, we consider the temporal causal effects in matrices ܣଵ to ܣ௣ as described 
in equation ( 3-2 ). The coefficients in these matrices are fit using a vector autoregression (VAR) 
model to the estimated model residuals updated for the effect of ܣ଴ estimated in the previous 
step. This fit is carried out by solving a multivariate least squares regression for the expression 
shown in equation ( 3-8 ). 
 ܣଵ்ݔ௧−ଵ + ڮ+ ܣ௣்ݔ௧−௣ = ߳௧ − ܣ଴்ݔ௧ ( 3-8 ) 
As was done with the ܣ଴ matrix, we simultaneously optimize each matrix ܣଵ to ܣ௣ by 
searching over all nearest neighbors of a random initial model structure and assigning each a 
score based on the BIC. We may then combine the results of both steps to represent the entire 
causal model as described in equation ( 3-2 ). 
Sparsest Permutation Method 
The sparsest permutation method, developed by Raskutti and Uhler [17] is another 
potential method to fit causal models. We find this method to be computationally efficient when 
applied to time series data with small numbers of variables, which makes it well suited for 
numerical simulation with many repetitions. The description of this algorithm as presented in 
Rakutti and Uhler [17] (p. 5) is: 
Let ܵሺܩሻ denote the skeleton of a DAG ܩ and |ܩ| the number of edges in ܩ (or ܵሺܩሻ). Then 
the [sparsest permutation] algorithm is defined as follows: 
(1) For all permutations ߨ of the vertices {ͳ,ʹ, … , [݊]} construct [described below] ܩ� and let ݏ� = |ܩ�|. 
(2) Choose the set of permutations {ߨכ} for which ݏ�כ is minimal amongst all permutations. 
(3) Output ܩ�כ for all ߨכ such that ݏ�כ is minimal amongst all permutations. 
The model ܩ is constructed by checking the conditional correlation between each 
variable. The edges of each DAG permutation are only retained when they satisfy the Markov 
condition; that is the conditional correlation of the connected variables given the preceding 
variables in the permutation is statistically non-zero. Therefore a directed edge between any two 
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variables ݆ and ݇ for ݆ < ݇ is retained if and only if the non-independence condition in equation ( 
3-9 ) is satisfied at some user specified confidence level �. 
 
ܺ�ሺ௝ሻ ⊥ ܺ�ሺ௞ሻ| ௌܺ �he�e ܵ = {ߨሺͳሻ, ߨሺʹሻ, … , ߨሺ݇ − ͳሻ}\{ߨሺ݆ሻ} ( 3-9 ) 
Raskutti and Uhler [17] show that for the case of joint normally distributed variables for 
non-time series data, this process can be simplified to the Cholesky decomposition of the inverse 
covariance matrix of our observations. In order to apply the sparsest permutation algorithm to 
time series data, we require some additional modifications to the method. 
For the case of joint normal variables with linear causal effects for non-time series data, 
we can represent a DAG structure as a linear recursive simultaneous equation model (SEM) for 
each ith observation as  
 
 
( 3-10 ) 
or in equivalent matrix form,           
 
 
( 3-11 ) 
where ܣ଴ is an upper triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal of the form 
 ܣ଴ = [ͳ −ܽଵଶ ڮ −ܽଵ௡Ͳ ͳ ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ −ܽሺ௡−ଵሻ௡Ͳ ڮ Ͳ ͳ ] ( 3-12 ) 
Because of the assumption of joint normality, we know that ߝ will be normally 
distributed and independent, such that 
 ܣ଴்ݔ௜~ܰሺͲ, ܦ଴ሻ ( 3-13 ) 
where ܦ଴ is the diagonal covariance matrix of ߝ. 
ݔ௝௜ = ∑ ௝ܽ௞ݔ௞௜ + ߝ௝௜௝−ଵ௞=ଵ  ݂݋ݎ ݆ = ͳ,… , ݊ 
ܣ଴்ݔ௜ = ߝ௜ 
 62 
We may solve this expression in equation ( 3-13 ) for ݔ௜ as 
 ݔ௜ ~ ܰሺͲ, �ሻ = ܰሺͲ, ሺܣ଴ܦ଴−ଵܣ଴்ሻ−ଵሻ ( 3-14 ) 
From this we may see that the covariance of the observed data, Σ, is enough to determine 
the matrix of causal model coefficients ܣ଴ by using the Cholesky decomposition. By calculating 
the Cholesky decomposition of every permutation of Σ and enforcing sparsity using equation ( 
3-9 ), we may find the model (or set of models) which are the most sparse, meaning the most 
parsimonious representation of the causal model. Raskutti and Uhler show that this approach is 
valid under strictly weaker conditions than traditional score based model fitting approaches [17]. 
For the case of time series data, we are interested in inferring causal effects that may take 
place across several time periods. Under similar assumptions of normality and linear causal 
effects, these time series effects may be represented using a vector autoregression (VAR) model 
with a lag length ݌, representing the number of prior periods for which causal effects may exist. 
This idea was described previously by Chen and Chihying [18]. This VAR model may again be 
expressed as 
 ܣ଴்ݔ௧ + ܣଵ்ݔ௧−ଵ + ڮ+ ܣ௣்ݔ௧−௣ = ߳௧ ( 3-15 ) 
where ݔ௧ is a vector of one observation of each variable at time ݐ. Assuming we have a stable 
process such that these effects do not vary over time, we can again rewrite this in a matrix form 
for the complete time series as previously shown in equation ( 3-3 ). 
 ܣ்ܺ௧,௣ = [  
 ܣ଴் Ͳ ڮ Ͳܣଵ் ܣ଴் ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ Ͳܣ௣் ڮ ܣଵ் ܣ଴்]  
 ܺ௧,௣ = ൮߳௧−௣ڭ߳௧−ଵ߳௧ )  ݂݋ݎ ݌ + ͳ ൑ ݐ ൑ ܶ ( 3-3 ) 
This large matrix on the left hand side of the equation containing the causal effects can be 
referred to as ܣ, and similarly the matrix describing the variance of the independent errors ߳ will 
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be a diagonal matrix ܦ where the diagonal elements are the variances of ߳, ܦ଴, repeated ܶ times. 
We may therefore describe this time series similarly to the case of time independent observations 
as 
 ܺ௧,௣ ~ ܰሺͲ, ሺܣܦ−ଵܣ்ሻ−ଵሻ ( 3-16 ) 
However, when estimating causal models from data, we often only have one observation 
for each variable at each time step.  We are therefore unable to directly estimate the sample 
covariance matrix, Σ̂ = ሺܣܦܣ்ሻ−ଵ.  However, we can determine the cross covariance, Λ, of a 
stationary time series up to ܶ − ͳ lags, and we can use this information to calculate the 
conditional distribution of the current time step data, ݔ், given the data at the previous ݌ lags.  
The autocovariance matrix describes the relationships between variables at each time step 
as well as between different time steps as shown in equation ( 3-17 ). 
 � = [ܮሺͳ,ͳሻ ܮሺͳ,ʹሻ ڮ ܮሺͳ, ݇ሻܮሺʹ,ͳሻ ⋱ ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ ܮሺ݇ − ͳ, ݇ሻܮሺ݇, ͳሻ ڮ ܮሺ݇, ݇ − ͳሻ ܮሺ݇, ݇ሻ ]  ݂݋ݎ ݇ = ͳ,… , ܶ ( 3-17 ) 
We may estimate the elements of the autocovariance matrix using equation ( 3-18 ) as the 
covariance of two time shifted sets ݔ௜ and ݔ௝ of our original ܶ observations, where for ݊ 
variables, each element ܮ will form an ݊ × ݊ matrix. 
 ܮሺ݅, ݆ሻ = ܿ݋ݒ(ݔ௜ , ݔ௝൯ ݂݋ݎ ݅ = ͳ, . . ݇, ݆ = ͳ,… , ݇ ( 3-18 ) 
Assuming we have a stationary time series process, we may utilize multiple samples of 
our time series with the same separation in time to estimate this covariance. Additionally, the 
autocovariance will not change over time and we may simplify the autocovariance as shown in 
equation ( 3-19 ). 
 ܮሺ݅, ݆ሻ = ܮሺ݅ − ݆ሻ = ܮሺ�ሻ ≡ ܮ�, � = ݅ − ݆;  ܮሺ݅, ݆ሻ = ܮሺ݆, ݅ሻ் ( 3-19 ) 
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Using stationarity, we may therefore simplify the matrix in equation ( 3-17 ) as a 
symmetric block Toeplitz (diagonal-constant) matrix as shown in equation ( 3-20 ). 
 � = [  
 ܮ଴ ܮଵ ڮ ܮ௞ܮଵ் ⋱ ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ ܮଵܮ௞் ڮ ܮଵ் ܮ଴]  
  ݂݋ݎ ݇ = ͳ,… , ܶ ( 3-20 ) 
Using this autocovariance matrix, we may calculate the distribution of our data as the 
current time step, ݔ௧ conditional on the values of each ݔ at the previous ݌ time steps. The 
covariance of matrix of this conditional distribution is calculated using the Schur compliment of 
the autocovariance matrix as shown in equation ( 3-21 ). 
 ܥܱܸ(ݔ௧|ݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣൯ = ܮ଴ − [ܮଵ ڮ ܮ௣+ଵ] [   
 ܮ଴ ܮଵ ڮ ܮ௣ܮଵ் ⋱ ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ ܮଵܮ௣் ڮ ܮଵ் ܮ଴]   
 −ଵ [ ܮଵ்ڭܮ௣+ଵ் ] = �଴ ( 3-21 ) 
Without loss of generality, we may consider each variable of our stationary time series to 
have zero mean. The conditional expectation for  ݔ௧ is then given as 
 ܧ(ݔ௧|ݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣൯ = [ܮଵ ڮ ܮ௣+ଵ] [   
 ܮ଴ ܮଵ ڮ ܮ௣ܮଵ் ⋱ ⋱ ڭڭ ⋱ ⋱ ܮଵܮ௣் ڮ ܮଵ் ܮ଴]   
 −ଵ [ݔ௧−ଵڭݔ௧−௣] = ܹ [ݔ௧−ଵڭݔ௧−௣] ( 3-22 ) 
Combining equations ( 3-21 ) and ( 3-22 ), we may represent the distribution of ݔ at the 
current time as shown in equation ( 3-23 ). 
 ݔ௧|ݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣~ܰ (ܹ [ݔ௧−ଵڭݔ௧−௣] , �଴) ( 3-23 ) 
By subtracting the mean term, ܹݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣, from both sides and performing a Cholesky 
decomposition of �଴, we get 
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 ݔ௧|ݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣ − ܹ [ݔ௧−ଵڭݔ௧−௣] = ܰሺͲ, ሺܣ଴ܦ଴−ଵܣ଴்ሻ−ଵሻ ( 3-24 ) 
Multiplying both sides by ܣ଴்  results in the final expression, 
 ܣ଴்ݔ௧|ݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣ − ܣ଴்ܹ [ݔ௧−ଵڭݔ௧−௣] = ܰሺͲ, ܦ଴ሻ = ߳௧ ( 3-25 ) 
where the time lagged causal effect matrices ܣଵ to ܣ௣ are given by 
 ܣ଴்ܹ = −[ܣଵ் ڮ ܣ௣்] ( 3-26 ) 
This provides a method for obtaining the matrix of causal coefficients, ܣ, directly from 
the auto-covariance matrix Λ. As with the original sparsest permutation algorithm, we can search 
over all possible permutations of our ݊ variables, recalculate the auto-covariance, and search for 
the sparsest coefficient matrix ܣ. 
Estimating Model Confidence and Parameter Uncertainty: The Robustness Metric 
Using any causal model fitting method, we may always estimate causal relationships 
between a given dataset and produce one (or sometimes several) causal models as output. 
However, it then falls to experts and analysts to determine if the resulting model is reasonable 
and should be trusted. The available data might be insufficient to make accurate estimates of 
causal effects or important variables may be missing, violating the common causal sufficiency 
assumption. While significant work has been devoted to selecting models based on minimizing 
unexplained variance in the observed data [47], these approaches may not necessarily result in 
correctly identifying model parameters. We therefore propose a metric to be used when fitting 
causal models which may assist in detecting when to accept a generated causal model. We find 
this metric also provides useful estimates of standard errors in model parameters in the case that 
the model is identified correctly. Understanding when to believe a fitted causal model and the 
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uncertainty in its parameters is critically important for decision makers attempting to utilize these 
models. Though this work is focused on applications with time series data, the metric also may 
be simplified to non-time series models as well. 
Robustness Definition 
The robustness metric is based on generating statistically similar datasets and refitting 
causal models to the newly generated data. By calculating the percentage of cases in which we 
observe the same model structure, we determine how robust each structure is to the inherent 
unexplained noise in the data.  
The first step of being able to calculate model robustness is the ability to generate 
statistically similar data. Our ability to generate statistically similar data relies on several 
assumptions: that we have sufficient number of observations to be representative of the 
underlying process, that noise in the autoregressive process is uncorrelated, and that our time 
series is stationary. While these assumptions are significant, they are already required 
assumptions for accurate estimation of causal models and therefore generating new data does not 
impose additional restrictions.  
For non-time series data, we would commonly use bootstrapping where we generate a 
new dataset by randomly resampling from our initial data with replacement. Since the ordering 
of observations is important for time series data, we utilize the autocovariance matrix of our 
initial dataset to generate new samples. As was described in the previous section on the sparsest 
permutation algorithm, we may manipulate the autocovariance matrix of observed data to find 
the conditional distribution of a single time step as given in equation ( 3-17 ). 
 ݔ௧|ݔ௧−ଵ,…,௧−௣~ܰ (ܹ [ݔ௧−ଵڭݔ௧−௣] , �଴) ( 3-17 ) 
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We may use this distribution to generate new statistically similar samples to our original 
data by sequentially generating samples. This requires a user specified initial condition for ݔଵ,…,௣, 
we may choose to generate more samples than required and remove some number of initially 
generated samples such that the effect of this user specified initial condition is negligible on our 
final data. We also must specify some lag length ݌ in order to generate new data. This lag length 
may be chosen to be arbitrarily larger than the expected length of significant causal effects in 
order to ensure the validity of the newly generated data. 
We may then utilize any potential time series causal model learning algorithm to estimate 
a causal model from many repetitions of this generated bootstrap data. We determine the 
robustness of a given model structure by calculating the percentage of these time series bootstrap 
samples which produced the same structure. Robustness may be calculated explicitly for ܰ runs 
with a single structure appearing ܭ times as shown in equation ( 3-27 ). 
 ܴ = ͳͲͲ ܰܭ ( 3-27 ) 
We propose that the robustness value of a model structure found using any causal model 
fitting method is a useful tool to determine whether that structure is equivalent to the true data-
generating model structure. We may also consider the value of maximum robustness as a 
measure of our confidence in the resulting model. 
In addition to acting as a model validation criterion, the robustness metric may be used to 
approximate the uncertainty in the coefficients of the causal model. For every instance of the 
model structure in the bootstrap sampling, the estimate of model coefficients will be slightly 
different due bootstrapping producing different time series realization. We may therefore 
calculate the standard deviation of each model coefficient and use this as a measure of the 
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standard error of the model coefficients, which can be critically important to analyzing the model 
in order to make decisions. 
Evaluation Criteria for Robustness Method 
In order to understand the efficacy of the proposed metric, we utilize several scoring 
criteria for causal model results when working with synthetically generated data with a known 
true coefficient matrix ܣ. First, we consider whether the model structures suggested by the 
robustness metric is observationally equivalent to the true data-generating structure. 
Observational or Markov equivalence is defined by Pearl and Verma [16] as follows: 
“Two DAGs (models) are observationally equivalent if and only if they have the same 
skeleton and the same set of v-structures, that is two converging arrows whose tails are not 
connected by an arrow” 
Put simply, observational equivalence means the chain of conditional dependencies does 
not represent a unique DAG, and therefore may not be exactly identified from observed data. 
Therefore, if a model that is observationally equivalent to the true model is returned by an 
algorithm, we consider this a success. Note that inspection of the model that is output by an 
algorithm will allow for identification of whether or not a model is observationally unique. For 
example, consider the causal model example from Figure 3-1. The relationships between ݔଵ, ݔଶ, 
and ݔଷ are not observationally unique as we could also have ݔଵ → ݔଶ or ݔଷ → ݔଶ (but not both) 
without creating or removing a v-structure, meaning the joint probability distribution described 
by these 3 possible models is equivalent. 
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In order to quantify the accuracy of the estimated coefficient values, we propose another 
scoring criterion utilizing the Frobenius norm of the difference of the true and fitted models 
normalized by the Frobenius norm of the true model. In order to construct this difference, we 
consider the full model coefficient matrix ܣ including contemporaneous and temporal effects as 
was utilized in equation ( 3-3 ). We then calculate this accuracy score as shown in equation ( 
3-28 ). 
 ߞ = ‖ܣ௧௥௨௘ − ܣ௙௜௧‖�‖ܣ௧௥௨௘‖�  ( 3-28 ) 
This results in the normalized root sum square error of the true versus predicted 
coefficient values. This score provides a quantitative measure of coefficient accuracy without 
requiring consideration of the model structure. This allows us to account for both when a model 
may have the correct structure but large error in coefficients, and also when a model might have 
a single incorrect structural element but be otherwise very close to the true model. 
Finally, we propose a scoring criterion to better understand the ability to predict the 
uncertainty in model coefficient values. To do this, we compute the difference between true and 
estimated coefficients and divide this difference by the standard deviation of coefficient values 
obtained for the equivalent model structure by the robustness metric. This results in a matrix of 
errors in the coefficient estimates normalized by the estimated coefficient uncertainty. Recalling 
that the coefficient matrix ܣ will have dimension ݊ሺ݌ + ͳሻ × ݊ሺ݌ + ͳሻ, where ݊ is the number 
of variables in ܺ and ݌ is the number of lags, this normalized error matrix Φ is calculated as 
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 Φ = [ܣ௧௥௨௘ − ܣ௙௜௧] ל [ ͳ/��1,1 ڮ ͳ/��1,�ሺ�+1ሻڭ ⋱ ڭͳ/���ሺ�+1ሻ,1 ڮ ͳ/���ሺ�+1ሻ,�ሺ�+1ሻ] ( 3-29 ) 
where ל represents the Hadamard product and ��ೕ,ೖ is the standard deviation calculated for the [݆, ݇] non-zero element of the estimated coefficient matrix ܣ from the robustness metric. If this 
standard deviation is a reliable estimator of coefficient standard error, we may check that the 
elements of Φ where model coefficients are non-zero should follow a standard normal 
distribution. 
Testing Robustness with Simulated Data 
To test our proposed metric, we randomly generate causal model structures ܣ and noise 
levels described by the diagonal matrix ܦ଴ as shown in equation.  
 ܦ଴ = [�ଵଶ Ͳ ͲͲ ⋱ ͲͲ Ͳ �௡ଶ] = ܿ݋ݒሺ߳ሻ ( 3-30 ) 
We then synthesize observed data for the generated model, apply the proposed metrics, 
and compare the resulting fitted model to the known true model by the scoring criteria proposed 
in the previous section. Once the ܣ and ܦ଴ matrices are created, we may generate any number of 
synthetic time series observations by drawing from the joint normal distribution specified by 
equation ( 3-31 ). This relationship is found directly by solving equation ( 3-3 ) for ܺ௧,௣. 
 
ܺ௧,௣ ~ ܰሺͲ, ሺܣܦ−ଵܣ்ሻ−ଵሻ ( 3-31 ) 
Coefficients are selected randomly from the interval [−ͳ,−Ͳ.Ͷ] ∪ [Ͳ.Ͷ, ͳ] such that the 
coefficients are bounded away from zero. In order to avoid fully connected models which will 
not be observationally distinguishable, we randomly set coefficients in ܣ to zero until meeting a 
target connectivity ratio ݎ defined as 
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ݎ = ݉݊ሺ݊ − ͳሻʹ + ݊ଶ݌ ( 3-32 ) 
where ݉ is the number of non-zero coefficients in the generated model ܣ and ௡ሺ௡−ଵሻଶ + ݊ଶ݌ is the 
maximum number of coefficients in an ݊ variable, ݌ lag model. 
Noise values are selected from a lognormal distribution such that the diagonal elements 
of ܦ଴ are defined as shown in equation ( 3-33 ). This distribution results in [5%, 95%] bounds for 
these variances from [0.31, 0.43]. Note that increasing the level of noise does not have a 
significant effect on the sparsest permutation algorithm or the robustness metric so long as we 
have sufficient data to accurately estimate the autocovariance. 
 ܦ௜௜~݈݋݃ܰሺ−ͳ,Ͳ.ͳሻ ( 3-33 ) 
The stationarity of the generated time series is ensured by checking that the roots of the 
characteristic polynomial of the vector autoregressive process as defined in equation ( 3-34 ) lie 
outside the unit circle such that 
 ܨ݋ݎ ܽ݊ݕ ݖ, |ݖ| ൑ ͳ ⇒ det (� − ܣ଴−ଵܣଵݖ − ڮ− ܣ଴−ଵܣ௣ݖ௣൯ ≠ Ͳ ( 3-34 ) 
Due to the computational expense of generating random models that meet this stationarity 
condition, we limit our numerical examples to time series of 3 variables with 1 or 2 lag periods. 
We then perform a case study applying the method of sparsest permutation for time series with 
the robustness selection metric for 1 or 2 causal lags, connectivity ratios of 0.4 or 0.5, and 
number of observations, ܶ, set to be 500 or 1000. For each case, 1000 random causal models are 
generated and tested. 
First, we consider the rate of success of the robustness metric to recover the true causal 
structure. Table 3-1 presents the percentage of the 1000 repetitions where the metric produced 
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successful recovery of the model structure. It can be seen that the most robust model is the 
correct model in at least 78% of trials, with higher success rates with increasing sample size and 
smaller models. Across all model size cases, the sparsest permutation algorithm sees an 88% 
correct identification rate, which agrees well with the results of a similar study for non-time 
series data from Rakutti and Uhler [17]. Note that based on using 1000 repetitions, uncertainty in 
these percentages is roughly 1-2% at the 90% confidence level. This may explain the higher 
recovery rate for ሺݎ = Ͳ.Ͷ, ݌ = ʹሻ as compared to ሺݎ = Ͳ.Ͷ, ݌ = ͳሻ with 1000 observations. The 
recovery rate of the sparsest permutation with the original data, not considering robustness, is 
included in parentheses. Note that this rate includes cases where the sparsest permutation 
algorithm outputs multiple equally sparse, non-equivalent results and only one is correct. 
Conversely, the robustness metric can always provide a single most robust structure. 
We may also consider how the calculated level of robustness is related to the chance of a 
model being identified correctly. If we find that low robustness models are more likely to be 
incorrect, we may choose only to trust models with a robustness greater than some threshold 
value. Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 show histograms of the robustness level of correctly and 
incorrectly identified models, respectively. These figures group all lag lengths, connectivity 
ratios, and sample sizes together as these factors are not found to influence the relationship 
between structure recovery and robustness level. 
We find that correctly identified models typically have a robustness level above 70-80% 
while incorrectly identified structures are approximately uniform across all robustness levels. 
This indicates we could use a threshold robustness value below which we may elect not to trust 
the causal model output. For example, only considering cases with a robustness of 90 or more, 
the identification rate improves from 88% to 97%, while at a robustness of 55% or lower the 
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chance of correctly identifying the true model falls below 50%. The robustness threshold could 
be specified by an analyst or expert based on the application and required model confidence.  
Next, we consider our coefficient accuracy score based on the normalized Frobenius 
norm of the difference in fitted and true coefficient matrices. Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 present 
box plots of the accuracy metric ߞ for the most robust model across the 1000 random models for 
each sample size, number of lags, and connectivity ratio for models selected by the robustness 
metric. 
We also consider the difference in accuracy score between the correctly and incorrectly 
identified models. We find this to be fairly consistent across different model sizes, so these 
results are all combined in Figure 3-6. 
We find that the robustness metric is relatively consistent across all model sizes in terms 
of accuracy score. Accuracy score is improved slightly with sparser models, lower model lags, 
and increased sample size but in general will be less than 0.1. This indicates that the parameter 
values in the model coefficient matrix ܣ will be identified accurately by the most robust model. 
We may also consider the relationship between robustness level and accuracy score. This 
relationship for all model sizes and numbers of samples is presented in Figure 3-7. 
We observe a correlation between model robustness and accuracy score, with increasing 
robustness related to more accurate models. As with the structure recovery rate, this indicates 
that the model robustness level may be utilized as a diagnostic to determine the confidence in the 
accuracy of the estimated model parameters. 
Finally, we calculate the error in coefficient estimation normalized by the standard 
deviation from the robustness metric. Because these results are consistent across each case 
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considered, we compile all results together. Figure 3-8 presents a probability plot of the observed 
normalized coefficient errors for all models. 
We find that this normalized error does follow a standard normal distribution, suggesting 
that the coefficient standard deviation is a reasonable estimate for the error in estimation of 
causal model coefficients. This standard deviation may therefore be used to understand possible 
causal effects not otherwise available in causal model fitting methods. 
Application to Real Data 
Wage-Price Dynamics 
In order to test our method with realistic data, we attempt to reproduce the findings of 
Chen and Chihying [18] regarding wage price dynamics using economic data from 1965-2004. 
We utilize the same dataset which is provided by the authors in their previous paper [48] and is 
drawn from the Federal Reserve economic database (FRED) [49]. The 6 variables used in the 
model defined by Chen and Chihying as ሺݓ, ݌, ݁, ݑ, ݖ, ߨ௠ሻ are respectively wage inflation, price 
inflation, labor utilization rate, capacity utilization rate, growth of labor productivity, and 
inflationary climate. These variables are made stationary using the transformations described in 
Table 3-2. 
We attempt to fit models to this data using both the sparsest permutation algorithm used 
in our numerical study as well as the algorithm proposed by Chen and Chihying which we refer 
to as the time series causal model (TSCM) method. The TSCM method utilizes a two-step 
process to first optimize the contemporaneous effects, ܣ଴, using a structural equation model 
approximation. Temporal effects are then optimized using a vector autoregression 
approximation, corrected for ܣ଴ from the initial step. In both steps, the model structure is 
optimized using a greedy search algorithm which searches over all nearest neighbors of a random 
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initial model structure by adding or removing one model connection. This search is repeated with 
multiple random initial structures. Models are scored for optimization using the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). More details of the algorithm may be found in the original paper 
[18]. 
The model found by Chen and Chihying is presented in Figure 3-9. We find that we are 
able to reproduce this model using the TSCM method described in the original paper, while the 
sparsest permutation produces different results as shown in Figure 3-10. Specifically, the 
contemporaneous matrix ܣ଴ has the permutation of the structure mostly reversed, while the 
temporal matrix ܣଵ more closely agrees with the TSCM result. This may be due in part to the 
fact that the sparsest permutation fits both ܣ଴ and ܣଵ simultaneously rather than sequentially. 
Both methods also utilize very different scoring and search criteria which may lead to divergent 
results when the available data is insufficient. When adequate data is available in our numerical 
testing, we do find that both algorithms produce similar results.   In order to reproduce model 
coefficients on the order of 0.02 as shown in the Chen and Chihying model, the sparsest 
permutation method must also use a very low confidence level when enforcing sparsity as 
described in equation ( 3-9 ); this has a significant effect on the model fit. 
Applying the robustness metric for either the TSCM method or the sparsest permutation 
method with low confidence results in a model robustness of effectively zero; each bootstrap 
sample results in a different model structure. This implies that the available data is not sufficient 
to support the very small coefficient values included in the Chen and Chihying model. We can, 
however, increase the confidence level for enforcing sparsity until the robustness metric 
produces repeatable models. A similar approach may be taken with the TSCM method by 
modifying the penalty on model degrees of freedom in the BIC score, though this modification is 
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less intuitive. Using a higher confidence level, the robustness metric applied to the sparsest 
permutation method produces the model shown in Figure 3-11 with a robustness of 29%. 
This robust model suggests that only 4 coefficients from the original model are supported 
sufficiently by the available data. Considering that even this model has a robustness level of only 
29%, one should still be hesitant to assume this model is correct. We may also consider the 
estimates of standard error in each coefficient obtained by the robustness metric, which are 
shown in Figure 3-12. Comparing the robust coefficient estimates and their standard error with 
the original Chen and Chihying model shows reasonable agreement. We may therefore consider 
that we have higher confidence in the values of these coefficients based on the available data. 
Overall, the high sparsity of the model compared to the Chen and Chihying model and low 
robustness suggest that additional data is likely needed in order to quantify some of the more 
complex effects governing these wage and price dynamics in question, depending on the level of 
confidence required by analysts. This finding agrees with previous literature such as Thompson 
[50] who discusses the difficulty of estimating covariance when using small sample sizes with 
data clustered both across time and across variables such as with the time series data considered 
here. 
Airline Industry Data 
In the previous chapter, we presented an example of an aircraft wing design considering 
interactions between the stakeholders of designers and airlines. However, in that case we 
developed simple expressions to describe the way that design choices interaction with 
stakeholder preferences. In reality, these interactions may be very complex and not well 
understood by the designer. We therefore consider relationships between the main stakeholders 
in commercial aviation; aircraft designers and manufacturers, airlines, and the public. We will 
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attempt to understand how welfare for these three groups is affected by various design choices 
and market conditions. 
Data collection 
In order to model the relationships between technology and welfare, we collected 20 
years of quarterly historical data on aircraft characteristics, stakeholder welfare, and other 
potentially influential market characteristics.  To avoid the impact of seasonality in the data, we 
considered all of our measurements on a four quarter rolling average.  For aircraft characteristics, 
we utilized the Bureau of Transportation TranStats database [27].  This database provides 
quarterly data on the type of aircraft and number of passenger miles flown dating back to 1990.  
Using this information, we constructed a representative aircraft as a weighted combination of all 
the different aircraft models utilized, where weights are proportional to the passenger miles 
flown by each model.  We considered 11 physical characteristics of the aircraft, which are shown 
in Table 3-3 and are collected directly from the manufacturer aircraft specification documents 
[26] [51]. Note that vehicle miles represent the total number of miles travelled by the aircraft, 
while passenger miles are multiple by the occupancy of the aircraft during travel. 
The TranStats database additionally provides quarterly profits as reported by each US 
airline [45] [46].  We simply summed the profits of each airline in each quarter as a measure of 
the overall welfare of the airline industry as a whole.  Similarly, we collected quarterly reports 
published by the two main commercial aircraft manufacturers, Boeing [43] and Airbus [44], and 
used their reported profits to determine the welfare of aircraft manufacturers.  For the public, we 
define welfare as the number of tickets purchased per capita as a measure of the accessibility and 
utilization of air transportation which is also obtained from the TranStats data. 
Finally, we collected data on several additional factors which may be influential to one or 
more of the stakeholders’ welfares.  These include the date, price of jet fuel, average airline 
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ticket price, listed cost of the representative aircraft, and 6 indicators of US economic health.  Jet 
fuel prices and average ticket prices are collected from Airlines for America [41], and the 
economic indicators are collected from Bureau of Labor Statistics [52] [53], Institute for Supply 
Management [54], University of Michigan [55], Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis [56],  and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysts [57].  A list of the economic indicators used can be found in Table 
3-3. 
Factor analysis 
To better understand the data we collected, we utilized factor analysis to reduce our data.  
This serves two purposes; first, reducing the dimensionality of our input space will reduce the 
computational expense of fitting a model and make the results much easier to interpret.  
Secondly, it is possible that multiple inputs from our collected data are all results of a common 
unobserved force.  For instance, the multiple weights of the aircraft, the fuel and passenger 
capacity, and the range are all strongly correlated, and changes in all of these observed values 
may simply represent a shift in airline behavior from utilizing smaller aircraft flying point to 
point routes to large aircraft utilizing a hub and spoke schedule. 
The goal of factor analysis is to construct a set of orthogonal factors as weighted 
combinations of our original inputs.  To perform factor analysis, we must first specify the 
number of factors to use.  One common method for determining an appropriate number of factors 
is based on principal component analysis, which transforms a set of inputs into an equal number 
of orthogonal components.  The total variance of the original data will be equal to the sum of the 
variances of each of these components; this means we can find a reduced number of components 
that still explains some prescribed threshold of the variance in our original data. 
In the case of our collected data, we find that four principal components are able to 
explain nearly 95% of the variance of the original data.  Using this information, we choose to 
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construct a four factor model using factor analysis.  Factor analysis also performs rotation of the 
factors such that the magnitude of the weights, or factor loadings, for each input is as close to 1 
or 0 as possible.  This makes it easier to interpret the resulting factors, as inputs will either be 
included or excluded in each factor.  Inputs whose factor loading magnitude are below some 
threshold value can be thought to have no real impact on that factor.  The four factors 
constructed along with their factor loadings are shown in Table 3-4. 
We note that each factor can be shown to represent a distinct set of inputs.  Factor 1 is a 
collection of all of the physical characteristics of the aircraft.  Based on the sign of the factor 
loadings, an increase the factor 1 is related to increased aircraft weight and reduced fuel 
efficiency.  We could therefore expect that improvements in technology would contribute to 
decrease the value of factor 1.  This factor might be explained as a representation of the fleet 
mixture being utilized, such as the percentage of wide-body versus narrow-body aircraft, where a 
higher magnitude represents more large aircraft in the fleet. 
Factor 2 contains all of the inputs related to the price of fuel, where an increase in the 
factor value relates to an increase in fuel cost.  Factor 3 contains all of the considered economic 
indicators, where an increase in the factor value is generally related to improved economic 
conditions.  Finally, factor 4 is mostly related to the listed price of the aircraft utilized, along 
with the maximum range.  An increase in factor 4 indicates an increase in aircraft cost and 
maximum range. 
Figure 3-13 and Figure 3-14 show the value of the three stakeholder welfare metrics and 
the four factors, respectively.  All measurements are normalized to have zero mean and unit 
standard deviation.  We observe factor 1 has shown a general downward trend over this date 
range, indicating aircraft generally becoming lighter and more fuel efficient, or equivalently that 
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airlines have shifted to more narrow-body aircraft.  Factor 2 has steadily increased, meaning fuel 
prices have risen as well as the fuel cost per seat mile flown.  Factor 3 has been relatively steady, 
with large drops in both 2001 and 2008; possibly reflecting the financial crises in both periods. 
Finally, factor 4 has increased slightly, meaning the aircraft being utilized by airlines have 
become more expensive and with increased range. 
Model results 
The representative directed acyclic graph for the resulting model fit with the TSCM 
method described earlier in this chapter is shown in Figure 3-15.  The circles at the center of the 
graph represent the variable at the current time, where M, A, and P are the manufacturer, airline, 
and public welfare, respectively, and each F term is one of the four factors.  The arrows between 
each of these circles indicate a contemporaneous causal effect in the direction of the arrow, and 
the number next to the arrow is the magnitude of the causal effect.  Note that the arrow from M 
to A is a dashed line, which indicates that this causal effect is not observationally 
distinguishable; the arrow could be turned in the other direction and this model would explain 
the observed data equally well. 
The squares around the outside of the figure represent all of the significant temporal 
effects, where the number in parentheses represents the lag of the effect.  For example, the term 
“M(-1)” in the box connected to P indicates that the manufacturer welfare in the previous period 
is found to have a causal effect on the public welfare in the current period.  The number to the 
left of each term represents the magnitude of the causal effect. 
In order to determine the complete magnitude of causal relationships between inputs we 
calculated the impulse response of a unit change in one variable on each of the others.  This 
allows us to express the contemporaneous and temporal effects together to see the net effect over 
time of a change in one variable on the others.  Figure 3-16 - Figure 3-22 present the impulse 
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responses of all seven variables to a change in each variable individually.  Each variable is 
initially at a steady state value of zero at period 1, and the impulse is applied at period 2, after 
which the value is fixed at zero.  The effects of this impulse are then seen over the subsequent 
four periods, returning to a steady state of zero in the final period.  The number to the right of 
each response plot shows the cumulative effect of the impulse on that variable as measured by 
the sum of the changes in the variable over the four impacted time periods.  Large peaks and 
valleys in the impulse response indicate that the variable may be more sensitive to the change in 
the input over time (the derivative) than the absolute magnitude of the input.  Note that a variable 
may have an impact on itself through temporal effects. 
Figure 3-16 shows that an increase in manufacturer welfare will have very little net effect 
on the aircraft value, public welfare, or fuel costs.  Airline welfare is negatively impacted by an 
increase in manufacturer welfare.  It can also be seen that factor 1, fleet characteristics, is 
positively impacted by an increase in manufacturer welfare.  Finally, manufacturer welfare is 
shown to affect factor 3, economic health.  The fact that the effect is first negative and then 
positive indicates the change in manufacturer welfare, as opposed to the magnitude, is influential 
on economic health.  While it seems unreasonable that aircraft manufacturers alone are 
influential on the entire US economy, these finding may indicate that aircraft manufacturers are a 
leading indicator of economic health, while our factor 3 is a lagging indicator. 
Figure 3-17 shows the impact of an impulse to airline welfare.  Airline welfare is found 
to have no impact on the manufacturer.  Fleet characteristics, fuel costs, and aircraft value see 
negligible effects from a change in airline welfare.  Like with manufacturer welfare, airline 
welfare is found to have a significant impact on economic health, though the net impact is small.  
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Again, this may indicate that airline profits are a leading indicator of economic health.  Public 
welfare is negatively impacted by an increase in airline welfare. 
Figure 3-18 shows the impacts of an impulse in factor 3, economic health.  The effects of 
economic health on manufacturers, aircraft value, and fuel prices are found to be negligible.  The 
cumulative effects of an impulse in economic health on all variables are quite small.  Airline and 
public welfare are found to be affected by changes in economic health from the previous period, 
as shown by the positive and negative peaks in both impulse responses.  Fleet characteristics are 
slightly impacted in the long term by an impulse in economic health.   
The impulse response for factor 4, aircraft value, is shown in Figure 3-19.  Manufacturer 
and airlines see no effect from aircraft value, and the change in economic health is negligible.  
Increasing aircraft value has a negative impact on factor 1, fleet characteristics.  Public welfare is 
significantly impacted by the change in aircraft value from the previous period, though the 
cumulative effects of a change are nearly zero.  Fuel costs are decreasing as aircraft value 
increases. 
Effects on an impulse in public welfare are shown in Figure 3-20.  We find that the 
manufacturer welfare is uninfluenced by public welfare, and aircraft value, fleet characteristics, 
and fuel costs are weakly impacted.  Public welfare is shown to have a positive impact on 
economic health, suggesting the tickets sold per capita may also be a leading indicator of 
economic health.  Airline welfare is significantly positively impacted by an increase in public 
welfare. 
Figure 3-21 displays the impulse responses for factor 1, fleet characteristics.  We see that 
economic health, public welfare, fuel costs, and aircraft value all have minor effects from 
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changes in fleet characteristics.  Manufacturers and airlines are both shown to experience a net 
increase in profits from an impulse in factor 1. 
Finally, Figure 3-22 shows the results of an impulse in factor 2, fuel costs.  Fuel costs are 
found no have no effect on manufacturer welfare and negligible effect on aircraft value.  Airline 
welfare, public welfare, and economic health all experience little net impact from an impulse, but 
are highly sensitive to changes in fuel prices from period to period as illustrated by the large 
peaks and valleys in their impulse responses.  Fleet characteristics experience a net negative 
impact from increases in fuel costs. 
We can also look at the residual error of our causal model fit to the true values of each 
input in order to understand how well our model is explaining the data.  Figure 3-23 shows the 
residuals for all 7 model inputs in their standard normal transformed values.  We see that in 
general, the prediction is within two standard deviations of the true value for every input.  Over 
the periods 1998-2002 and 2008-2010, we see large spikes in the residuals, indicating our model 
does not provide accurate values in these regions.  This may indicate that our measure of 
economic health, factor 3, does not capture the full impact of the financial crises that took place 
in these two periods, or that other compounding events have a causal impact over these dates.  
Additionally, we can see that the residual values for each input are highly correlated, and there is 
a upward linear trend in the residuals over time.  This suggests that there are likely one or more 
additional important causal effects not included in our available data. 
We may check our confidence in this model by applying the robustness metric. Similarly 
to then data from Chen and Chihying, we find that very few coefficients are considered 
significant, and even then model robustness is low suggesting that the model may not be reliable 
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due to having insufficient data available. However, we may still consider that the results of the 
model may be useful to a decision maker if they are aware of these concerns. 
Model discussion 
Based on these results, we might infer several relationships between stakeholder welfare, 
economic conditions, fuel prices, and aircraft characteristics.  First, we observe that manufacturer 
welfare is only influenced slightly by changing fleet characteristics, and that manufacturer 
welfare at previous time periods is capable of approximating their current welfare.  This result 
seems reasonable, as decisions about development and sales of new aircraft are typically made 
well in advance of their actual implementation.  Were we able to extend the lag time of our 
model back multiple years, we might begin to see more interaction effects based on economic 
conditions, other stakeholder decisions, and new technology.  Even still, we find that the 
manufacturer’s past performance in the short time lag considered does a reasonably good job of 
predicting their welfare in the current period. 
We also note that changing fleet characteristics are only a part of changes to the welfare 
of manufacturers and airlines.   At the same, changes in aircraft characteristics are shown to be 
reactive to changing market conditions.  This may be strongly influenced by the short time frame 
we are able to model, where changes in aircraft characteristics may be dominated by airlines 
choosing to modify the mixture of different types of aircraft in their utilized fleet as opposed to 
the introduction of new technology.  Still, this model suggests that the success of new research 
and design activities will depend largely on changing market conditions and how airlines are 
available to change their fleet, so efforts should be made to consider future conditions when 
developing new technologies. 
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Figure 3-1. Directed acyclic graph for a Bayesian network. (From Chen and Chihying [18]) 
 
Figure 3-2. Number of correctly identified structures by robustness level (n = 7073) 
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Figure 3-3. Number of incorrectly identified structures by robustness level (n = 927) 
 
(a)          (b) 
Figure 3-4. Accuracy score for each model size with 500 observations in (a) full and (b) zoomed 
plots 
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(a)          (b) 
Figure 3-5. Accuracy score for each model size with 1000 observations in (a) full and (b) 
zoomed plots 
 
Figure 3-6. Accuracy score for correctly and incorrectly identified models 
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Figure 3-7. Comparison of model robustness and accuracy score for all cases 
 
Figure 3-8. Probability plot of normalized error for all model sizes 
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Figure 3-9. Chen and Chihying causal model using TSCM method 
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Figure 3-10. Sparsest permutation model results for wage-price dynamics 
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Figure 3-11. Robustness metric suggested model for wage-price dynamics 
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Figure 3-12. Robust model temporal coefficient standard error 
 
Figure 3-13. Normalized stakeholder welfare 
 
Figure 3-14. Normalized factor magnitude 
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Figure 3-15. Causal model DAG structure 
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Figure 3-16. Manufacturer welfare impulse response 
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Figure 3-17. Airline welfare impulse response 
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Figure 3-18. Factor 3 (economic health) impulse response 
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Figure 3-19. Factor 4 (aircraft value) impulse response 
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Figure 3-20. Public welfare impulse response 
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Figure 3-21. Factor 1 (fleet characteristics) impulse response 
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Figure 3-22. Factor 2 (fuel costs) impulse response 
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Figure 3-23. Residual values of causal model fit 
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Table 3-1. Robustness method structure recovery rate for ݌ lags and connectivity ratio ݎ 
(recovery rate of sparsest permutation without considering robustness) 
500 observations 
 ݎ = Ͳ.Ͷ ݎ = Ͳ.ͷ ݌ = ͳ 95% (93%) 88% (92%) ݌ = ʹ 87% (92%) 78% (78%) 
1000 observations 
 ݎ = Ͳ.Ͷ ݎ = Ͳ.ͷ ݌ = ͳ 96% (95%) 90% (90%) ݌ = ʹ 97% (91%) 86% (84%) 
Table 3-2. Raw data used for empirical investigation of the model [18] 
Variable Transformation Mnemonic Description of the untransformed 
series e log(1-UNRATE/100) UNRATE Unemployment Rate (%) 
u log(GDPC1/GDPPOT) GDPC1, GDPPOT 
GDPC1: Real Gross Domestic Product 
of Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, 
GDPPOT: Real Potential Gross 
Domestic Product of Billions of 
Chained 2000 Dollars, u: Capacity 
Utilization: Business Sector (%) � log(HCOMPBS) HCOMPBS Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour, Index 1992=100 � log(IDPBS) IDPBS Business Sector: Implicit Price Deflator, Index 1992=100 z log(OPHPBS) OPHPBS Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons, Index 1992=100 
Ɏ୫ MA(d�)  Inflationary climate measured by the moving average of price inflation in 
the last 12 periods 
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Table 3-3. Collected input data 
Physical 
Characteristics Welfare Measures 
Economic 
Indicators Other 
Maximum Range Manufacturer Profit† 
Consumer 
Sentiment Fuel Price
†
 
Maximum Speed Airline Profit† Expected vs Actual Inflation 
Fuel Cost per 
Available Seat 
Mile† 
Useful Payload Tickets Sold per Capita 
Production 
Manager’s Index Date 
Fuel Capacity 
 Change in Gross 
Domestic Product† 
Average Ticket 
Price† 
Vehicle Miles per 
Gallon 
 Change in 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Listed Aircraft 
Price† 
Passenger Capacity 
 Change in 
Unemployment 
 
Zero Fuel Weight    
Operating Empty 
Weight 
   
Required Flight 
Crew 
   
Maximum Takeoff 
Weight 
   
Available Seat 
Miles per Gallon 
   
†All dollar values corrected for inflation 
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Table 3-4. Constructed factors and corresponding factor loadings 
Factor 1: Physical 
Characteristics Factor 2: Fuel Cost 
Factor 3: Economic 
Conditions 
Factor 4: 
Aircraft Value 
Maximum 
Range -0.74 Fuel Cost 0.67 
Consumer 
Sentiment 0.26 
Maximum 
Range 0.44 
Maximum 
Speed 0.92 
Fuel Cost per 
Available 
Seat Mile 
0.70 Expected vs Actual Inflation -0.28 
Listed 
Aircraft 
Price 
0.84 
Useful Payload 1.00   Production Manager's Index 0.85   
Fuel Capacity 0.99   
Change in Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
0.25   
Vehicle Miles 
per Gallon -0.88   
Change in 
Consumer Price 
Index 
0.62   
Passenger 
Capacity 0.98   
Change in 
Unemployment -0.91   
Zero Fuel 
Weight 0.99       
Operating 
Empty Weight 1.02       
Required 
Flight Crew 0.94       
Maximum 
Takeoff 
Weight 
0.99       
Available Seat 
Miles per 
Gallon 
-0.81       
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  CHAPTER 4
ASSIGNING VALUE TO SAFETY: A STUDY OF COST EFFETIVENESS OF 
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY MEASURES 
French Chapter Summary 
Dans les chapitres précédents, nous avons généralement considéré les préoccupations 
envers la sureté du transport aérien comme étant  simplement modélisé par un indicateur 
économique définissant la valeur statistique de la vie. Toutefois, une analyse préliminaire des 
pratiques en matière de sureté des transports révèle que ces approximations simples ne sont 
souvent pas respectées. La sureté a des effets importants sur la perception qu’ont les 
consommateurs de concepteurs ou des fournisseurs de services. De plus les types et les 
probabilités de différents problèmes de sureté jouent un rôle important dans l'attention qu'ils 
reçoivent. Pour tenter de mieux comprendre ces préoccupations, nous procédons à une analyse 
du rapport coût-efficacité des mesures de sécurité adoptées dans le domaine du transport aux 
États-Unis sur la période 2002 - 2009. Grâce à cette analyse, nous pouvons acquérir une 
meilleure compréhension de l'importance des facteurs qui influent sur la relation entre valeur et 
sureté dans les problèmes de conception de systèmes complexes. Nous constatons que malgré 
une fatalité très inférieure, les compagnies aériennes et le transport par autobus sont soumises à 
un surcoût réglementaire bien plus important en comparaison avec l'aviation de loisir et le 
transport en voiture personnelle. Nous menons une étude sur deux grandes enquêtes sur les 
accidents de l'aviation commerciale et sur deux grandes campagnes de rappels de sureté 
automobile pour lesquels nous calculons le rapport coût-efficacité. Cela montre que les mesures 
prises pour améliorer la sureté suite à des accidents ont tendance à être très rentables pour le 
transport aérien, tandis que pour le transport automobile elles peuvent ne pas être rentables. Basé 
sur l'analyse de ces études, nous trouvons que la demande du public pour plus de sureté semble 
être grandement affecté par le niveau de la responsabilité personnelle des victimes impliquées. 
 104 
En outre, nous trouvons que l'efficacité de différents types de mesures de sureté (réglementation 
ou enquête / rappel) est affecté par le nombre relatif de véhicules concernés, le nombre de vies en 
danger, et le niveau de sureté relative du mode. La question de savoir si une réponse 
réglementaire reflète la véritable demande du public pour la sureté ou simplement leur éventuelle 
perception erronée de la sureté est une considération importante afin de maximiser l'impact des 
ressources limitées affectées à l’amélioration de la sureté. 
Overview 
Thus far, we have generally considered the effect of safety concerns as simply modeled 
using a common economic construct known as the value of statistical life. However, even a 
cursory analysis of practices in transportation safety reveals that such simple approximations are 
often violated. Safety has important effects on consumer perception of designers and service 
providers, and relationships between the types and probabilities of various safety issues play an 
important role in the amount of attention they receive. To attempt to better understand these 
concerns, we conduct an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of safety measures enacted in the 
transportation industry in the United States in recent history. Through this analysis, we may gain 
a better understanding of the important factors affecting the relationship between value and 
safety in engineering design problems. The work in this chapter represents a joint effort with Dr. 
Taiki Matsumura who developed the cost effectiveness calculation for accident investigations 
[58]. 
Background 
Travel related fatalities continue to be a leading cause of accidental death in the United 
States [59], despite significant improvements in recent decades [60]. In attempting to improve 
safety performance, one important constraint of new safety measures is cost, for which the US 
Department of Transportation uses the guideline of the value of statistical life, most recently set 
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at $9.1 million [35]. Such constraints avoid undue financial burden on individual travelers and 
commercial transportation while ensuring that funds are not over-allocated to a single issue but 
spread across multiple risk sources. 
A survey is conducted of the cost of US federal government regulations for safety 
enhancement in various modes of transportation, including commercial air carriers, commuter 
and air taxi, general aviation, private automobiles, and buses. This survey is intended to reveal 
how resources have been allocated for different modes of transportation. We will seek to uncover 
whether public demand for safety varies across different modes of transportation and if so, to 
determine why this might happen. We also investigate four significant transportation safety cases 
from the past decade, two from commercial aviation and two from automobiles, to attempt to 
determine if their remedies are cost effective.  In each of these cases, we consider a system 
design flaw related to a miscalculation, manufacturing or maintenance error, or unexpected 
operating condition which led to a risk of fatal accidents.  We determine the break-even point of 
the investment by calculating the probability of a fatality prior to the safety improvement 
necessary to justify the cost of the improvement. Through this demonstration, we discuss the cost 
effectiveness of the current safety improvement cycle in the civil transportation sector. 
Several significant prior works have examined the way the cost effectiveness of safety 
improvements has been analyzed. Viscusi and Aldy [19] provide a detailed overview of various 
factors affecting the applied value of statistical life. Morrall [20] and Tengs et al. [21] both 
provide reviews of the cost effectiveness of previously implemented or proposed life-saving 
measures across many different fields. Cropper and Portney [22] outline some of the difficulties 
faced by regulators and policy makers in attempting to quantify cost effectiveness for new safety 
measures. Hammitt and Graham [23] outline the difficulty in assessing survey respondents’ 
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willingness to pay for safety, particularly in the case of highly unlikely events. Arrow et al. [24] 
provide a discussion of the ways in which cost-benefit analysis can and should be used to shape 
public policy. 
Air travel has enjoyed many advances in safety technology since its inception. Safety 
enhancement in aviation is achieved not only by the evolution of technology, but also by 
incremental design improvements triggered by accidents. There were several epoch-making 
accidents that facilitated the evolution of the safety system [61] [62], such as repeated accidents 
of the De Havilland Comet in the 1950’s leading to the recognition of metal fatigue. Aviation 
accidents have high public profiles due to a large number of potential fatalities. However, past 
research on the economics of aviation safety [63] [64] [65] [66], mainly triggered by the public 
concerns of airline deregulation in 1978 in the U.S., showed that market forces do not provide 
sufficient incentives for additional safety improvement. Thus, one important incentive for safety 
enhancement for air travel is safety measures mandated by laws and government regulations. 
Private automobiles have also seen a great improvement in safety over recent decades. 
Safety features such as seat belts and air bags have become standard on all new vehicles, and 
campaigns for and in some cases laws requiring the use of seat belts have reduced the morbidity 
of accidents [67].  The advent of crash testing performed by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Association (NHTSA) starting in 1979 has allowed for objective measurement of safety and 
facilitated competition between auto manufacturers on their safety performance [68]. A major 
issue for improving highway safety has been related to driver behavior, such as speeding, 
impaired driving, distracted driving, or the use of safety devices such as seat belts [68]. There is 
substantial investment by local governments in enforcing laws that promote safe driver behavior. 
Enforcement of pilot training and responsible behavior is stricter in commercial air travel, where 
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a small group of highly trained pilots receive much more oversight by the FAA, relative to the 
standards for private automobile drivers.  
Transportation Safety and Regulation 
Safety Statistics 
In order to examine the emphasis of the US government on transportation safety, we 
surveyed the accident related statistics and economic impact of new safety regulations enacted 
between 2002 and 2009.  
To understand resource allocation for transportation safety, we must first quantify the 
level of safety in each transport mode. We utilize the conventional metric of fatalities per billion 
passenger miles1 travelled. Data for passenger miles traveled and fatalities for various modes of 
transportation for years 2002 to 2009 were obtained from the 2010 National Transportation 
Statistics report . We categorized the mode of aviation according to the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). CFR Part 121 is the regulation governing scheduled commercial airliners 
(we call it ‘commercial air’ in this work); CFR Part 135 governs on-demand air taxis and 
scheduled commuter carriers, such as business jets and regional airlines (‘commuter and air 
taxi’); and CFR Part 91 governs general aviation.  
Additionally, the report contains safety statistics for highway transport, from which we 
distinguish private automobiles (cars, SUVs, light trucks, and motorcycles) and buses. Since the 
number of passengers involved in private transport is not explicitly known, we rely on survey 
estimations. The 2009 National Household Travel Survey [69] offers estimates of number of 
passengers and average distance traveled, from which we can determine passenger miles and 
total departures. Similarly, the annual FAA General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey [70] 
                                                 
1
 Passenger miles represent the total vehicle miles travelled multiplied by the average passenger load for a given 
mode 
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provides an estimation of the total number of departures for general aviation and commuter and 
air taxi operations separately. However, there is no data regarding the average number of 
passengers on these trips, and therefore we assume ranges of load factors to compute passenger 
miles traveled for these modes.  
Table 4-1 shows the number of fatalities per billion passenger miles by mode of 
transport. We see that air carrier would be judged to be the safest mode, and roughly 250 times 
safer than private automobiles. General aviation, even with our highest estimates for passenger 
loads, is the least safe mode by a significant margin, while commuter and air taxi safety is 
comparable to private automobiles’. Buses rank as the second safest mode, but still are nearly an 
order of magnitude less safe than air carriers. 
Regulation Review 
Next, we consider the economic impact of Federal Government regulations that were 
enacted over the same time period. Transport safety regulation system in the United States is 
complex. A review we have conducted on http:www.regulations.gov yielded over 3,500 relevant 
regulations published from 2000-2009 by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). The reason for including safety 
regulations that pre-date the numbers for transport safety indicators we report above is to include 
any regulations whose effects might be delayed several years. 
A summary review of the number and cost of regulations reviewed by agency is provided 
in Table 4-2. While there are too many regulations to list each individually, the highest cost 
regulations issued by each agency are explained in more detail in the following section with 
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more listed in Appendix B. If regulations are deemed to involve a significant cost2, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) requires a cost-benefit analysis, and we use this analysis to 
determine the cost of each regulation to the US economy and transportation industry. 
Notable Regulations Reviewed 
While NHTSA is responsible for the most significant cost with a total of $73B, the FAA 
issued the highest number of regulations with 3297, 2140 of which were Airworthiness 
Directives (AD). Only 330 of the 3578 regulations reviewed were deemed to have a significant 
cost and therefore reviewed for cost effectiveness by the OMB. While regulations not deemed 
significant may have some non-zero cost, we feel this may be neglected due to the low cost of 
some significant regulations, as low as hundreds of dollars over 10 years. We additionally note 
that a small number of these regulations constitute a majority of the costs, so it is therefore 
worthwhile to consider some of these individually. 
The single most expensive regulatory action of this time period is NHTSA’s Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy standards which cost an estimated $47B; as this regulation has a minimal 
effect on transportation safety, we remove this regulation from our analysis and this cost is not 
included in Table 4-2 or subsequent analyses. Other significant regulations include: two 
regulations for $14B and $10B from NHTSA to improve rollover and roof crush risks, $12B 
from NHTSA for the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation 
Act, $13B from the FMCSA to update commercial driver rest requirements, and FAA 
regulations of $1.3B, $1.1B, and $1.0B which related to maintenance on late life aircraft, aircraft 
material flammability standards, and catastrophic fuel tank explosions, respectively. Regulations 
                                                 
2 A regulatory action is considered “economically significant” under Executive Order 12866 § 3(f)(1) if it is likely 
to result in a rule that may have: “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health 
or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” 
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which are not considered significant are often FAA ADs which re-designate airspace, or any 
agency’s updated testing requirements which do not require significant changes to existing 
practice; we therefore consider potential costs of such regulations as negligible. 
Regulatory Attention by Transport Mode 
We aggregate the above safety regulations by mode based on the description provided in 
the regulation documentation, calculate the dollars spent on each mode over the entire period, 
and compare this to the number of observed fatalities, as shown in Table 4-3. Note that some 
regulations may be counted multiple times in this table if they are estimated to affect multiple 
transport modes. It can be seen that air carriers and buses receive much more regulatory attention 
per fatality than other modes. The regulation cost per fatality of air carriers is about 200 times as 
large as that of private automobiles. 
While some of the regulations considered may have direct economic value beyond 
improving safety, we consider that improving safety is the primary benefit of each regulation.  
Based on our review of the most cost significant regulations as shown in Appendix B, we feel 
this is a reasonable assumption. We must recognize that a regulation would be deemed cost 
effective by the number of fatalities prevented, which we have no way of estimating.  Instead, we 
consider the regulation cost per fatality observed, which gives us an idea of the total fatalities 
that could have been prevented, assuming that the number of fatalities would not have increased 
significantly absent the regulations. For comparison, we may consider the DOT specified value 
of statistical life (VSL), which is currently set at $9.1 million per fatality prevented. 
Using this cost per observed fatality as a metric, we find that the cost of regulations for 
public modes of transportation, air carriers and buses, is significantly higher than their private 
counterparts, general aviation and private automobiles.  As the rate of regulatory spending per 
fatality in these two modes is higher than the VSL, it may be argued that regulators are 
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responding to a higher public demand for transportation safety in these modes. Commuter and air 
taxis receive moderate regulatory attention as compared to commercial aviation and general 
aviation, while general aviation and private automobiles, the two least safe modes, received the 
least regulatory spending per fatality by the US federal government. 
Cost Effectiveness Study of Specific Fatal Accident Responses 
The cost of regulations cited in the previous section is based on government estimates 
justifying the regulations. It is instructive to look at the actual costs incurred to correct some well 
publicized safety defects. Such an examination reveals that there are additional costs, including 
the cost of investigations to determine what safety defect caused fatalities, and the cost to recall 
vehicles. 
Cost Effectiveness Measures of Safety Investigations and the Resulting Remedies 
Accident investigations have been playing a central role in improving aviation safety. 
Elaborate investigations identify the probable causes of accidents and lead to safety 
recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. Independence of 
investigators from other authorities and separation from blame guarantee the quality of 
investigations, and aviation pioneered in this regard among other civil transportation modes [71] 
[72]. More recently, it has been proposed that the approaches and methods of aviation accident 
investigation be extended to wider context of social concerns, such as natural disaster, or 
economic fraud [73] [74]. Aviation is also a mode of civil transportation for which accident 
investigation is mandated in the U.S, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is 
responsible for it. 
Similarly, the NTSB carries out accident investigations for private automobiles, though 
due to the sheer number of accidents, not all will receive NTSB attention.  When a safety issue is 
found requiring attention, typically after one or more accidents take place, the Department of 
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Transportation may mandate a recall of a certain vehicle or family of vehicles. As with aviation 
accidents, a series of accident and safety investigations may be undertaken; however unlike some 
aviation cases this is a relatively negligible cost for automobile recalls. It then falls to the 
responsibility of the manufacturer to provide an appropriate safety remedy for the affected 
vehicles and to cover the costs of this repair.  Though automotive recalls and aircraft accident 
investigations are not identical, we view the results of both actions in terms of reacting to a 
safety issue with new measures as similar enough for comparison. 
For a cost effectiveness study, we deploy a simple break-even calculation of the 
investment in an accident investigation or recall and focus on fatal accidents. The expense, C୧୬v, 
is the cost of the investigation and the following safety remedies, if needed. The payoff is the 
expected monetary value of lives to be saved, Vୱୟvୣୢ, in the future as a result of the investigation 
and remedies. Potential future fatalities related to an accident are calculated by the product of the 
expected number of fatalities N୤ that would result from a similar accident, the number of 
airplanes or automobiles Nୟ that have the same failure potential, and the probability of 
reoccurrence of the accident in the remaining lifetime. For estimating Nୟ, one may take into 
account not only existing vehicles but also not-yet-built ones that will potentially benefit in the 
future from the improved design and safety regulations. Accident investigation has the potential 
to change the probability of accident reoccurrence, through implementation of the recommended 
safety measures. On this basis, the expected monetary value of lives to be saved (Vୱୟvୣୢ) can be 
calculated as Vୱୟvୣୢ = Vଵ୪୧୤ୣN୤ NୟሺPୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ − Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰ሻ ( 4-1 ) 
where Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ is the value of a single life, Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ is the probability of a fatal accident occurring per 
remaining lifetime of one vehicle before safety improvement is applied, and Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰ is the 
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probability of an accident after the improvement is applied. The break-even point happens when 
the invested cost in the investigation and remedies, C୧୬v, is equal to Vୱୟvୣୢ. 
The dollar value of a fatality, Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ, is defined as the amount we are willing to give up in 
exchange for a small decrease in the probability of one less fatality, called the value of a 
statistical life [75]. This is a common approach in economics, used to evaluate effectiveness of 
policies in medicine, environment and other areas. How much a society should invest in 
preventing fatalities is controversial, as seen in many ongoing discussions in different 
communities, e.g., health care, transportation, environment, etc. Viscusi [76] analyzed data on 
worker deaths across different industries, and suggested that the value of a life lies in the range 
of $4.7 to $8.7 million. In aviation, economic values used in investment and regulatory decisions 
of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) were analyzed and determined. The guidance 
led to the value of $6.2 million per fatality adopted in 2011 [77] and most recently updated it to 
$9.1 million in 2013 [35]. Similarly in Europe, an aviation fatality avoided is valued at € 4.05 
million by the European Transport Safety Council in 2003 [78].  
For a given investigation and remedy cost C୧୬v, it is possible to calculate how much we 
spend to prevent the loss of one life in the future as  Cଵ୪୧୤ୣ = C୧୬vN୤ NୟሺPୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ − Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰ሻ ( 4-2 ) 
This measure would be compared to the DOT guideline to determine whether accident 
investigation is cost effective or not. On the other hand, the value of lives to be saved can be 
used as the cost effective threshold of the invested cost C୧୬v,୲୦ or the accident probability Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ assuming that Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰ is zero as in equations ( 4-1 ) and ( 4-2 ) respectively. C୧୬v,୲୦ = Vଵ୪୧୤ୣN୤ NୟPୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ ( 4-3 ) 
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Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ = C୧୬vVଵ୪୧୤ୣN୤ Nୟ ( 4-4 ) 
Case Studies for Investigations into Fatal Accidents 
American Airlines flight 587 
The first example is the fatal accident of American Airlines Flight 587, which occurred 
on November 12, 2001. The airplane, an Airbus A300-605R, crashed into a neighborhood in 
Belle Harbor, New York, after taking off from the John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 
260 people aboard and five people on the ground were killed [79] [80].  
NTSB determined that the probable cause was “the in-flight separation of the vertical 
stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate strength that were created by the first officer’s 
unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs (when the pilot reacted to wake turbulence).” The 
NTSB report concluded that “The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program 
excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic 
and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence.” The report also discussed a widespread 
misunderstanding among pilots about performance of the rudder limiter system; pilots believed 
that a limiter would prevent structural damage no matter how they moved the control. However, 
the limiter did not take into account structural damage caused by repetitive opposite direction 
rudder inputs which resulted in the excessive load.  
FAA issued an airworthiness directive (AD) in 2011 [81] requiring the modification to 
the rudder control system, called the pedal travel limiter unit (PTLU). The AD estimates the 
implementation cost of PTLU for 215 airplanes in the fleet at $42,677,500. For the cost 
effectiveness study, the number of potential fatalities was estimated at 213, based on the typical 
passenger capacity of the model (266 passengers) and a load factor of about 80% , and nine 
crewmembers. Adding the costs of accident investigation and other safety remedies (e.g., pilot 
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training), which are not publicly available, the total invested cost is roughly estimated as $52 
million US 2013 dollars. 
Using above data, we calculate the cost effectiveness threshold of the accident probability Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ defined in equation ( 4-4 ). Based on $9.1 million for Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ, Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ is estimated at 
1.2x10-4 in the remaining lifetime of a single airplane. This probability corresponds to 6.0x10-9 
per flight assuming that the remaining life time is roughly half the design service goal of the 
airplane (40,000 flight cycle [51]). It is remarkable that this probability is substantially smaller 
than the actual rate of fatal accident per departure from 2002-2009, 1.8x10-7 . Therefore, it can be 
said that this accident investigation is cost effective unless the probability of the accident is 
extremely small. 
Alaska Airlines flight 261 
The next example is the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261, which occurred on January 
31, 2000. Fatalities included two pilots, three cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers. The 
airplane, MD-83, was destroyed by impact forces [82]. The NTSB concluded that the probable 
cause was “a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal 
stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly’s acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by 
excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines’ insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew 
assembly.” 
According to the NTSB report, several factors contributed to the accident. First, 
lubrication of the nut threads was not adequately performed. Second, there were inappropriately 
wide lubrication and inspection intervals for the wear condition; because of this, wear exceeding 
its critical condition could not be discovered before the following lubrication or inspection point. 
The FAA issued airworthiness directives (ADs) [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] requiring 
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repetitive inspections and lubrication. These improvements were applicable not only to MD 
series but also to Boeing airplanes. Table 4-4 shows the fleet sizes of airplane models, to which 
the ADs were applied, and the passenger sizes of those airplanes obtained from the company’s 
website. We roughly assume that five inspections and lubrications would be needed in the rest of 
the lifecycle of each airplane, and the overhaul of nut and screw, which was applied only to 
Boeing-737, is a one-time item. Based on the work hours and labor rates provided by the ADs, as 
well as the estimated cost of inspection, we calculate the total cost for the safety improvements 
as roughly $18.5 million US 2013 dollars. 
In the same manner as the previous example, we calculate the cost effective threshold of 
the accident probability as 2.5×10-6 per lifetime of single airplane. Here, we used $9.1 million for Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ, and the number of potential fatalities to be saved is calculated by summing up N୤ Nୟ of 
each airplane model shown in Table 4-4 with a load factor of 80%. This probability can be 
converted into 1.2×10-10 per flight, which is also much lower than the actual fatal accident rate 
(1.8x10-7). Note that we assume that the remaining flight cycle of the airplane is 20,000, half the 
design service goal of a typical airplane. 
Despite being the two most fatal aviation accidents in the US over the time period we 
cover in this study, their total safety regulation cost (about $67 million) only represents about 1 
percent of the total regulation cost of $7.5B as described in Table 4-4.  
Ford/Firestone tread separation and rollover recall, 2000 
The first automotive recall considered is the Ford/Firestone tire recall in 2000.  NHTSA 
found that Firestone Wilderness AT and ATX tires produced at the Firestone plant in Decatur, IL 
were subject to tread separation during operation in certain conditions, particularly low pressure, 
high speed, hot weather operations, which could lead to increased risk of vehicle rollover when 
the tires fail.  In particular, these tires were installed on Ford sport utility vehicles, where it was 
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thought this issue would lead to a higher risk of roll over [90]. Firestone issued a recall of a total 
of 6.5 million tires, affecting roughly 1.3 million vehicles [91].  Though estimates vary, 
somewhere between 150 and 300 fatalities are thought to have been caused by this tread 
separation issue [92].  The total direct cost of this recall, shared between Firestone and Ford, is 
estimated at between approximately $1.3-1.7B in 2013 dollars [93]; the cost of investigation is 
assumed to be negligible as NHTSA’s entire annual highway safety program budget is roughly 
$120M. 
Using $9.1M as the value of statistical life, and considering an average passenger load for 
private automobiles as 1.5 based on the 2009 National Household Travel Survey [69], we 
calculate a threshold probability of a fatal accident per vehicle between 7.4×10-5 and 9.7×10-5.  
In the case of automobile accidents, we can also estimate the actual probability of failure before 
the recall since we have a large number of vehicles and accidents.  Based on the 1.3M vehicles 
affected and NHTSA’s most likely estimate of tread separation related fatalities of 197 [92], we 
find the probability of a fatal accident as 1.5×10-4, with 5% and 95% confidence bounds of 
1.3×10-4 and 1.7×10-4.  We may additionally correct this probability to account for the fact that 
the 6.5M tires recalled were not all at end of life, and some may have failed later had they not 
been recalled. However, since this would depend on individual operating conditions, driving 
habits, tire age, and probability of tire failure over tire life, it is difficult to make any meaningful 
assessment, though we conservatively estimate a range from a factor of 1.5 to 3 increase in fatal 
accident probability based on the average age of vehicles included at the time of the recall and 
their expected life. 
We find that the estimated range of probability of a fatal accident is only slightly higher 
than the range of threshold probability of failure based on the data collected. This indicates that 
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the safety increase due to the recall likely at least broke even with the costs, and could be as 
much as a factor of 3 more.  However, we note that this is a much narrower margin that seen 
with the previous two cases of accident investigations in air travel. 
It should be noted that this investigation led to one of the most significant regulations for 
private automobiles during the time of our survey.  This is the Transportation Recall 
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, which cost a total of $24B, 
38% of all private automotive regulation costs during our survey period from 2002-2009.  
However, this regulation deals exclusively with the way manufacturers report recalls and safety 
concerns to NHTSA, and does not specifically address the issue of tread separation or rollover 
and therefore this cost is not included in our calculations for this investigation. 
Toyota unintended acceleration recall, 2009/2010 
The second auto case considered is actually two related recalls which occurred at roughly 
the same time which dealt with the unintended acceleration accidents involving Toyota vehicles 
in 2009 and 2010.  The first recall replaced floor mats in some Toyota vehicles which were 
believed to potentially cause the accelerator pedal to stick.  The second dealt with wear in the 
accelerator pedal that could cause sticking unrelated to the floor mats.  These recalls affected 
2.23M and 4.44M vehicles, respectively.  Due to overlap in the recalls, a total of nearly 5M 
vehicles were recalled. Toyota vehicles with fatal accidents attributed to unintended acceleration 
account for as many as 48 deaths [94], though DOT investigations concluded that many such 
accidents may actually be related to driver error [95].  The direct cost of the recalls, as reported 
by Toyota, was $1.12B [96] and the cost of the investigation is again assumed to be negligible in 
comparison. 
Again using the value of statistical life of $9.1M and an average passenger load of 1.5, 
we find that the threshold probability of a fatal accident per vehicle for cost effectiveness is 
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1.65×10-5.  We again estimate the actual probability of failure based on the number of fatal 
accidents observed, and find a nominal value of 4.96×10-6 with confidence bounds of 3.00×10-6 
and 6.91×10-6.  As with our previous auto recall example, we recognize that these estimates are 
based on some vehicles which are not at end of life.  However, in this case we consider that it 
may be reasonable to assume that the probability of this specific accident is constant over the 
lifetime of the vehicle, and we may try to estimate the average age of vehicles in the recall.  
Based on available data, we consider that the average vehicle recalled was 5 years old, with a 
useful life of 15 years.  Since we assume the probability of an accident is constant over time, we 
may simply correct our calculated probability of failure by a factor of 3, such that we find the 
estimated probability before the recall as 1.49×10-5 with confidence bounds of 9.00×10-6 to 
2.07×10-5.  Even with this correction, we see that it is very likely that the probability of a fatal 
accident prior to the recall was below the cost effectiveness threshold. 
Since this recall happened outside the date range of our regulation study, we have no 
direct information about any regulations resulting from this recall and investigation.  However, 
the authors are unaware of any current or proposed regulations related to these Toyota recalls. 
Discussion of Cost Effectiveness 
Based on the studies presented in the previous sections, we may draw some conclusions 
about the cost effectiveness of safety measures for various modes and the allocation of resources 
within the US transportation sector.  We may also attempt to understand some broader 
implications for safety measures based on differences between different transport modes. 
First, we find that commercial aviation receives much more regulatory attention per 
fatality than general aviation. At the levels of regulatory spending seen during the years 
considered (2002-2009), commercial aviation received regulatory spending per fatality at a rate 
of roughly three times the DOT VSL.  At the same time, general aviation received the second 
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lowest regulatory attention per fatality despite being the least safe mode in our study based on 
fatalities per passenger mile. General aviation additionally received the lowest regulatory 
emphasis in terms of absolute dollars spent over the time period considered at $2.82 billion as 
compared to $6.43 billion for commercial aviation. A recent study of general aviation safety by 
Thomas Frank at USA Today [97] found that 86% of general aviation accidents are attributed to 
pilot error, including cases where subsequent investigations reveal defective parts contributed to 
an accident. These findings suggest that public demand for safety is lower when an individual is 
perceived to be responsible for their own safety, even though this may not always truly be the 
case. 
We consider several reasons why this disparity between modes might exist.  First, while 
fatal commercial airline accidents tend to be catastrophic events involving a large number of 
fatalities, general aviation accidents typically few people and occur more frequently and with 
less national coverage.  Additionally, a different level of individual responsibility exists in 
general aviation accidents, where those involved are at least perceived to have some control over 
ensuring their own safety.  This personal responsibility does not exist in commercial air travel, 
where travelers must place their trust in the pilot to ensure their safety. These factors together 
may lead to a higher perceived risk from commercial air travel by the general public, which is 
then reflected in their demand for new regulations. Even if risks are well understood, individuals 
may feel that a higher level of safety is appropriate in modes where a third party is providing 
transportation. 
This idea is reinforced by the allocation of new regulations in private automobiles and 
bus travel, where buses receive much more regulatory attention, possibly due to the fact that, as 
with the aviation case, bus accidents involve a larger number of people who are dependent on a 
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single driver to ensure safety. Finally, in the case of private automobile, much of the regulation 
and enforcement of responsible driver behavior is executed by state and local government. In 
that realm we see new regulations such as requiring seat-belt use and prohibitions on using cell 
phones. However, the increased regulatory cost of such measures is not expected to be able to 
offset greatly the factor of 450 between regulatory spending per fatality between buses and 
private automobiles. 
These findings have important implications for future developments in transportation 
such as partially or fully automated transport systems. Many automobile companies and research 
groups have made significant efforts to develop autonomous or self-driving cars. As of 2015, 
four states (California, Nevada, Florida, and Michigan as well as the District of Columbia) have 
legalized the use of autonomous vehicles on public roads. A 2014 University of Michigan study 
of public perception of autonomous cars [98] found that 88% if survey respondents expressed 
concern about the prospect of riding in a fully autonomous vehicle, while over 60% also 
responding that the use of fully autonomous vehicles would be expected to reduce both the 
number and severity of accidents. These results reflect our suggestion that entrusting one’s safety 
to an external actor increases an individual’s demand for safety. Designers of autonomous 
systems as well as policy makers should therefore consider the public’s increased demand for 
safety in these new modes as they develop. 
We also reviewed two of the largest airline accident investigations and two of the largest 
automobile recalls from roughly the same time period.  While both airline accident investigations 
were found to be easily cost effective by at least an order of magnitude based on the expected 
number of fatalities prevented, the automotive recalls were not so clear, with one being slightly 
cost effective and one likely below the cost effectiveness threshold.  This implies that these more 
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reactive safety measures are more likely to be cost effective for aviation compared to 
automobiles. 
We propose that this difference is due to two factors: the population size of the vehicles 
affected, and the relative reliability of both systems.  Though safety investigations for private 
automobiles are relatively inexpensive, the cost of performing a recall is often quite high even 
when the cost of a remedy is low due to the large numbers of vehicles involved, often millions.  
Conversely, commercial aviation accident investigations may be much more costly, but the 
resulting safety recommendations are only implemented on several hundred aircraft or less.  
Compounding this issue is the relative value at risk in terms of the number of people affected per 
accident, which is much greater for air travel than for automobiles.  This means that fixing any 
one issue for an airline will result in a large proportional increase in safety, while for 
automobiles this safety increase may be only marginal. 
This reveals important considerations for designers as well as regulators, as the types of 
safety issues faced in all transport modes typically have very low probabilities of occurrence, on 
the order of one in one million or less. This means that uncovering and preventing safety issues 
during the design process requires extensive testing and simulation, which is costly, and these 
costs are ultimately passed on to consumers. These costs are only exacerbated when the method 
of failure is unknown or difficult to predict, such as those related to operator error. We see that 
for airliners, safety concerns are easier to detect due to the rarity of accidents and in-depth 
investigation into each accident, while with private automobiles individual issues may be more 
difficult to find and are clearly more expensive to remedy due to the large cost of recalls. 
Furthermore, the financial incentives for designers in commercial aviation and private 
automobiles are quite different. The relative low cost of addressing safety concerns in 
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commercial aviation does not provide significant financial incentive for designers to attempt to 
avoid them, and public opinion after accidents generally affects airlines with little impact on 
designers [63] [64] [65] [66]. Conversely, we have shown that automobile recalls pose a 
significant financial burden applied directly to automobile designers. Automobile designers face 
additional losses related to public perception of their brand as they compete on safety records 
[99]. This may suggest that the automobile market is more efficient at creating improved safety, 
while commercial aviation safety requires more regulatory involvement. This might help to 
justify the differences in regulatory attention between modes. Understanding these differences 
between each mode may assist in an effective balance between preventative design and testing 
improvements versus oversight and improvements to existing products.  
Summary of Findings 
We have shown that despite their significantly better safety records, airlines and buses 
receive much more regulatory emphasis as measured by dollars per observed fatality as 
compared to general aviation and private automobiles, respectively.  This could be due in part to 
non-regulatory safety actions in modes like private automobiles such as traffic enforcement and 
seat belt requirements, as well as an avoidance to the higher cost of safety remedies in these 
modes as seen in our review of recalls. We conducted a study of two major commercial aviation 
accident investigations and two major automobile safety recalls and calculated the cost 
effectiveness of each, finding that these tend to be much more cost effective for air travel, and 
may not be cost effective for automobiles.  Based on analysis of these studies, we find public 
demand for increased safety appears to be greatly affected by the level of personal responsibility 
for ensuring safety. Additionally, the effectiveness of various types of safety measures 
(regulation or investigation/recall) is shown to be affected by the relative number of affected 
vehicles, the number of lives at risk, and the relative safety level of the mode. The question of 
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whether this application of regulatory emphasis reflects the true public demand for safety or 
merely their possible misperception of safety is an important consideration for policy makers 
attempting to maximize the safety impact of limited resources. Designers and policy makers 
should be aware of these affects as they work on improving existing transportation as well as the 
development of novel modes. New forms of transportation such as self-driving cars may not only 
need to be safer than traditional cars, but may have even more stringent safety requirements. 
Table 4-1. Annual fatalities per billion passenger miles (Year 2002-2009). The number in 
parentheses is the average number of fatalities per year during the period. 
Air Carrier Commuter 
and Air Taxi 
General 
Aviation Private Auto Bus 
0.038 (21) 4-11a (42) 30-160a (560) 9.09 (41,000) 0.26 (45) 
aPassenger loads for commuter and general aviation are estimated at 5-10 and 1-3 passengers, respectively 
Table 4-2. Breakdown of reviewed federal-government regulations by cost and agency 
 FAA FMCSA NHTSA DOT Total 
Number of 
Regulations 3297 34 187 60 3578 
Number of 
Regulations with 
Significant Costb 
282 13 31 4 330 
Total Significant 
Regulation Cost $7.5B $18B $73B $375M $99B 
Cost of Top 3 
Regulations 
$1.3B, 
$1.1B, 
$1.0B 
$13B, 
$0.48B, 
$0.38B 
$14B, $12B, 
$10B 
$280M, 
$89M, $5M 
$14B, 
$13B, $12B 
bBased on regulations with cost estimates reviewed by US OMB 
 Table 4-3. Total federal regulation cost per fatality in millions for various transport modes (Year 
2002-2009). The number in parentheses is the total cost in billions during the period. 
Air Carrier Commuter 
and Air Taxi 
General 
Aviation Private Auto Bus 
$31 
($6.4) 
$11 
($4.8) 
$0.50 
($2.8) 
$0.15 
($63) 
$69 
($31) 
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Table 4-4. Parameters estimated for Alaska Airlines case 
Aircraft Family Fleet size* Passenger size (model) 
MD-80 1218 155 (MD-83) 
Boeing-767 411 218 (767-300ER) 
Boeing-737 1641 162 (737-800) 
Boeing-747 236 416 (747-400) 
Boeing-757 730 280 (757-300) 
Boeing-777 203 365 (777-300ER) 
* Fleet size registered in the US 
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 CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we utilized a game theory framework in order to directly incorporate the 
effect of stakeholder interactions into a design optimization problem in order to maximize 
designer profitability. This approach allows for consideration of the effects of uncertainty both 
from traditional design variabilities as well as uncertain future market conditions and stakeholder 
interactions. Additionally, we developed techniques for modeling and understanding the nature 
of these complex interactions from observed data by utilizing causal models. Finally, we 
examined the complex effects of safety on design by examining the history of federal regulation 
on the transportation industry. 
The key contributions of this research are as follows: 
 The development of a novel optimization framework utilizing game theory methodology 
to account for the effect of interactions between multiple stakeholders, each of whom are 
performing their own profit maximization. Both simultaneous and sequential interactions 
were considered. This method allows for designers to maximize their expected profits 
while considering customer demands, competitors’ actions, and changes in exogenous 
market variables. 
 Optimization considering interactions was employed for several example problems, 
including the conceptual design of a commercial transport aircraft wing. Our findings 
from this work indicate that reasonable changes in market conditions are much more 
likely to have a significant effect on design choices than changes in traditional design 
uncertainty sources such as mechanical properties. Additionally, we showed that the level 
of market forecast uncertainty faced by a designer also has a significant effect on the 
optimal concept selected. These findings point to the importance of considering 
interactions and market uncertainty during design, as well as providing a framework 
through which designers may generate designs which are robust to various possible future 
conditions. 
 A basic overview of learning causal models from observed data was provided. In 
particular, a novel method was developed for fitting causal models to time series data 
utilizing the existing sparsest permutation algorithm. We found that this algorithm 
showed high accuracy and low computational cost for the general size of model that a 
designer might generally be faced with. 
 A novel metric for causal model confidence was proposed, based on the robustness of a 
given causal model with resampled data. We demonstrate through simulated data that this 
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metric provides a measure of confidence in the accuracy of the resulting fitted causal 
model. In addition, this metric is able to produce accurate estimates of model coefficient 
uncertainty, which can be critically important information for designers who need to 
estimate the impact of new design concepts. 
 A review of transportation safety statistics and improvements was conducted for the 
period of 2002 – 2009 in the United States. This revealed that regulatory attention for 
improving safety is not allocated among different transport modes proportional to the 
safety of each mode. Instead, we find that modes which involve a high level of personal 
responsibility for safety, such as general aviation or personal automobiles, receive 
significantly less regulatory attention per fatality than their public counterparts. We 
propose that this reflects an increased demand for safety from the public when entrusting 
their safety to a third party. This finding has important implications for both policy 
makers as well as designers working on novel transportation systems such as autonomous 
vehicles. 
 Dans de ce travail, nous avons proposé d’utiliser le cadre de la théorie des jeux 
afin d'intégrer directement l'effet des interactions entre les parties prenantes dans 
un problème d'optimisation de la conception visant à maximiser la rentabilité du 
concepteur. Cette approche permet de tenir compte des effets de l'incertitude liés à 
la fois aux variabilités traditionnelles sur les paramètres de conception ainsi que 
ceux liés au futur état du marché et aux interactions avec les autres acteurs du 
milieu. En outre, nous avons développé des techniques de modélisation visant à 
comprendre la nature d’interactions complexes à partir des données observées en 
utilisant des modèles causaux. Enfin, nous avons examiné les effets de la sureté sur 
la conception en examinant l'histoire de la réglementation sur l'industrie du 
transport. 
Les contributions clés de cette recherché sont les suivantes: 
 Le développement d'un nouveau cadre pour la conception optimale utilisant 
une méthodologie issue de la théorie des jeux pour tenir compte de l'effet 
des interactions entre des parties prenantes multiples, où chacune effectue 
sa propre maximisation du profit. Des interactions simultanées et 
séquentielles ont été considérées. Cette méthode permet aux concepteurs de 
maximiser leurs profits attendus tout en tenant compte des demandes des 
clients, les actions des concurrents, et les changements dans les variables 
exogènes de marché. 
 Ce nouveau cadre d’optimisation a été employé sur plusieurs problèmes 
d’application, notamment la conception d'une aile d'avion de transport 
commercial. Les résultats indiquent que des variations raisonnables dans 
les conditions du marché sont beaucoup plus susceptibles d'avoir un effet 
significatif sur les choix de conception que les variations liés aux sources 
d'incertitude traditionnels tels que les propriétés matériaux. En outre, nous 
avons montré que l’incertitude sur la prévision du marché futur a 
également un effet significatif sur le concept optimal sélectionné. Ces 
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résultats soulignent l'importance de considérer les interactions et 
l'incertitude du marché lors de la conception, ainsi que la nécessité d’un 
cadre permettant la conception de systèmes robustes vis-à-vis de différents 
états futurs de l’environnement socio-économique. 
 Un aperçu de l'apprentissage de modèles causaux à partir des données 
observées a été fourni. Une nouvelle méthode a été développée pour la 
construction des modèles causaux à partir des données de séries 
chronologiques utilisant l'algorithme de la permutation creuse. Nous avons 
trouvé que cet algorithme a une bonne précision et un faible coût de calcul 
pour des tailles de modèle raisonables. 
 Une nouvelle métrique a été proposé pour quantifier le niveau de confiance 
dans le modèle causal construit. Cette métrique est basée sur la robustesse 
d'un modèle causal obtenu avec des données rééchantillonnées. Nous 
démontrons sur des données simulées que cette mesure fournit une bonne 
mesure de confiance dans l'exactitude du modèle de causalité construit. En 
outre, cette mesure est en mesure de produire des estimations de 
l’incertitude des paramètres du modèle. Cette mesure d’incertitude peut 
être d’une grande utilité pour les concepteurs qui ont besoin d'estimer de 
manière fiable l'impact de nouveaux concepts. 
 Une étude des statistiques et des mesures pour améliorations de la sureté 
des transports a été réalisée pour la période de 2002 - 2009 aux États-Unis. 
Cette étude a révélé que l'attention des organismes de régulation n'a pas été 
répartie entre les différents modes de transport proportionnellement à la 
sécurité de chaque mode. A la place, nous constatons que les modes qui 
impliquent un haut niveau de responsabilité personnelle, comme l'aviation 
de loisir ou le transport en voiture personnelle, reçoivent nettement moins 
de contraintes réglementaires que les modes transport en commun (aviation 
commerciale, autobus). Cela reflète sans doute une demande accrue pour la 
sureté lorsque le public confie sa sécurité à un tiers.
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APPENDIX A  
AIRCRAFT DESIGN PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The total induced drag and lift distribution are approximated using lifting line theory 
[100], and can be calculated as Lሺyሻ = ɏV∞Γሺyሻ ( A-1 ) 
D = ɏV∞ ∫ Γ�i�(∑�A୬ �i�ሺ� כ � כ ��� yሻ�i�ሺ� ��� yሻ୬ )dyୱ−ୱ  ( A-2 ) 
Where ߩ is the air density, ∞ܸ is the free stream velocity, ݏ is the wing half-span, and Γ is 
the circulation given as 
Γ = Ͷ�V∞ ∑A୬ �i�ሺ� כ � כ ��� yሻ୬  ( A-3 ) 
And the terms ܣ௡ can be determined by taking some finite ݊ and solving the system of 
equations given by 
∑A୬ �i�ሺ� כ � ��� yሻ୬ (�i�ሺ� ��� yሻ + �C୪α�ͺ� ) = C୪α�ͺ� �i�ሺ� ��� yሻሺα − α଴ሻ ( A-4 ) 
Where c is the local chord length, � is the angle of attack, �଴ is the zero-lift angle of 
attack, and �࢒� is the slope of the lift coefficient, approximated from thin airfoil theory as ʹߨ/ݎܽ݀ [100]. 
Based on the drag determined above, we calculate the fuel burn for the aircraft using the 
thrust specific fuel consumption for the engines.  Fuel burn serves as our primary aerodynamic 
discipline performance measure. 
We then consider the structure of the wing as a tapered box beam subjected to the 
distributed load described by the lift distribution in equation ( A-1 ).  Since the wing structure 
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must fit inside the wing, we constrain the outer dimensions of our box beam based the 
dimensions of a NACA 22112 airfoil, similar to those used on commercial transport aircraft.  
Based on this airfoil, we restrict the width and height of the box beam to 60% and 10% of the 
chord length, respectively, as shown in Figure A-1. 
The box beam has two design variables: the horizontal member thicknesses at the wing 
root and wing tip. Because the wing considered in our example is only subjected to pure bending, 
the dimensions of the vertical members are not significant. Figure A-2 shows the dimensions of 
the box beam. 
We optimize this structure in order to minimize weight (volume) subject to maximum 
stress and deflection constraints at some limit load, with the aircraft designer defined safety 
factor, ܵܨ.  The weight of the wing structure is then calculated based on the volume of the design 
using the ratio of the nominal volume of a Boeing 737-700 wing structure and wing weight.  The 
angle of attack is then updated based on equation ( A-1 ) such that the total weight of the aircraft 
with the new structure is equal to the total lift at cruise. 
The design is then subjected to a certification test subject to material property 
uncertainty, where the design must meet a specified knockdown factor against constraint 
violation determined as a function of the number of tests performed; the probability of not 
meeting this criterion will cause the aircraft designer to face a certification penalty. This penalty 
knockdown factor is given as 
 K୮ୣ୬ = K୫୧୬ + K୰ୟ୲ୣN୲ୣୱ୲  ( A-5 ) 
This is intended to represent design requirements such as A-basis and B-basis used by the 
FAA, where increased number of tests would reduce the 95% confidence bounds, thereby 
reducing the required knockdown factor. 
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To calculate the probability of failure and probability of certification penalty, we 
calculate the design stress and design critical elastic modulus where the maximum 
deflection/span is achieved and compare to a prescribed variation in yield stress and elastic 
modulus based on a 5% COV in both properties.  Assuming that both yield stress and elastic 
modulus follow a normal distribution, we calculate the probability of failure and certification 
penalty directly from these properties’ cumulative distribution functions. 
 
Figure A-1. NACA 22112 airfoil and approximate box beam dimensions [101] 
  
Figure A-2. Box beam dimension definitions 
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APPENDIX B  
SIGNIFICANT REGULATIONS 
Table B-1. Significant FAA Regulations 
Document 
ID Summary 
Mode(s) 
Affected1 
Effective 
Date 
 Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years  
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FAA-1999-
5401-0145 
Amends inspection and records 
keeping for aircraft of greater than 
14 years of use.  
C,A 3/4/2005  $   1,350,000,000  18% 
FAA-2000-
7909-0043 
The FAA is adopting upgraded 
flammability standards for thermal 
and acoustic insulation materials 
used in transport category 
airplanes. 
C,A,G 8/2/2003  $   1,084,000,000  14% 
FAA-2005-
22997-0154 
Amends FAA regulations that 
require operators and 
manufacturers of transport 
category airplanes to take steps 
that, in combination with other 
required actions, should greatly 
reduce the chances of a 
catastrophic fuel tank explosion. 
C 9/19/2009  $   1,012,000,000  13% 
FAA-2002-
12261-009 
This final rule permits the 
initiation of Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minimum (RVSM) 
flights in the airspace over the 
contiguous 48 States of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, 
Alaska, that portion of the Gulf of 
Mexico where the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) 
provides air traffic services, the 
San Juan Flight Information 
Region (FIR), and the airspace 
between Florida and the San Juan 
FIR. 
C,A,G 10/27/2003  $      579,466,667  8% 
FAA-2007-
28058-0008 
Adopts a new airworthiness 
directive (AD) for various IAE 
turbofan engines. This AD 
requires removing certain No. 4 
bearing oil system components 
from service at the next shop visit 
or by an end date determined by 
the engine model. 
C 8/20/2008  $      450,371,650  6% 
1Affected modes are defined as: C = Commercial, A = Air Taxi, G = General 
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Table B-1. Continued 
Document 
ID Summary 
Mode(s) 
Affected1 
Effective 
Date 
 Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years  
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FAA-2000-
8490-0010 
This final rule amends the list of 
airspace locations where Reduced 
Vertical Separation Minimum 
(RVSM) may be applied to include 
the New York Flight Information 
Region (FIR) portion of West 
Atlantic Route System (WATRS) 
airspace. 
G 12/10/2001  $      262,000,000  3% 
FAA-2005-
20836-0046 
Adopts a new airworthiness 
directive (AD) for certain Boeing 
transport category airplanes related 
to the flammability of installed 
insulation blankets 
C 12/15/2008  $      177,700,000  2% 
FAA-2004-
18379 
Fuel tank safety requirements 
related to electrical wiring, 
including updated inspection 
requirements for wiring systems. 
C 12/10/2007  $      166,400,000  2% 
FAA-2001-
11133-2709 
The FAA is creating a new rule for 
the manufacture, certification, 
operation, and maintenance of 
light-sport aircraft. Represents an 
overall update to manufacture of 
aircraft and certification of pilots. 
G 9/1/2004  $      158,400,000  2% 
FAA-2005-
20245-0075 
Amends cockpit voice recorder 
(CVR) and digital flight data 
recorder (DFDR) regulations 
affecting certain air carriers, 
operators, and aircraft 
manufacturers in order to improve 
the availability of CVR and DFDR 
information. 
C,A 4/7/2008  $      153,636,364  2% 
FAA-2001-
11032-0007 
This amendment implements two 
security design requirements 
governing transport category 
airplanes related to the security of 
commercial aircraft cockpit doors 
to unauthorized intrusion. 
C 1/15/2002  $      131,000,000  2% 
FAA-2003-
15085-0075 
The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) is amending 
its hazardous materials (hazmat) 
training requirements for certain 
air carriers and commercial 
operators. 
C,A 11/7/2005  $      107,500,000  1% 
FAA-2005-
23500 
Airworthiness Directive for 
International Aero Engines V2500 
Turbofan Engines 
C 11/15/2007  $        99,338,400  1% 
1Affected modes are defined as: C = Commercial, A = Air Taxi, G = General 
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Table B-1. Continued 
Document 
ID Summary 
Mode(s) 
Affected1 
Effective 
Date 
 Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years  
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FAA-2000-
7018-0120 
The interim final rule established 
fees for FAA air traffic and related 
services for certain aircraft that 
transit U.S.-controlled airspace but 
neither take off from, nor land in, 
the United States. 
C 8/20/2001  $        97,000,000  1% 
FAA-2001-
8724-0002 
This final rule amends the existing 
airport security rules. It revises 
certain applicability provisions, 
definitions, and terms; reorganizes 
these rules into subparts 
containing related requirements; 
and incorporates some 
requirements already implemented 
in security programs. 
C,A 11/14/2001  $        92,200,000  1% 
FAA-2007-
0411-0001 
Revises an existing airworthiness 
directive (AD) that applies to all 
Boeing Model 747 series 
airplanes. That AD currently 
requires that the FAA-approved 
maintenance inspection program 
be revised to include inspections 
that will give no less than the 
required damage tolerance rating 
for each structural significant item, 
and repair of cracked structure. 
C 1/22/2008  $        90,090,000  1% 
FAA-2002-
12504-0001 
This final rule requires improved 
flightdeck security and operational 
and procedures changes to prevent 
unauthorized access to the 
flightdeck on passenger-carrying 
aircraft and some cargo aircraft 
operated by foreign carriers under 
the provisions of part 129. 
C,A 6/21/2002  $        83,200,000  1% 
FAA-2004-
18775 
Brings US European 
Airworthiness standards closer in 
regards to flight guidance systems 
C,A 5/11/2006  $        69,636,364  1% 
FAA-2007-
0412-0001 
Revising an existing airworthiness 
directive (AD) that applies to all 
Boeing Model 747 series airplanes 
related to corrosion and cracking 
certification. 
C 1/22/2008  $        62,304,000  1% 
1Affected modes are defined as: C = Commercial, A = Air Taxi, G = General 
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Table B-1. Continued 
Document 
ID Summary 
Mode(s) 
Affected1 
Effective 
Date 
 Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years  
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FAA-2006-
26722-0039 
Adopts several standards of the 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and requires 
manufacturers to incorporate 
certain security features in the 
design of new transport category 
airplanes related to unauthorized 
access to the cockpit of 
commercial category aircraft. 
C 11/28/2008  $        60,500,000  1% 
FAA-2001-
10910-0484 
The FAA is revising the 
applicability of certain collision 
avoidance system requirements for 
airplanes. 
C 5/1/2003  $        59,000,000  1% 
FAA-2004-
18019-0006 
The FAA is adopting a new 
airworthiness directive (AD) for 
Honeywell International Inc. 
related to stage 1 disk inspection 
and service 
A 4/18/2005  $        58,151,000  1% 
FAA-2004-
18038 
Airworthiness directive for 
Honeywell T53 turboshaft engines 
life limit reduction for certain 
engine components 
G 2/16/2006  $        58,000,000  1% 
FAA-2001-
10047-0232 
The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) is updating 
and revising the regulations 
governing operations of aircraft in 
fractional ownership programs. 
G 11/17/2003  $        57,200,000  1% 
FAA-2007-
28283-0013 
Adopts a new airworthiness 
directive (AD) for certain Boeing 
Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –
800 and –900 series airplanes. 
This AD requires a one-time 
general visual inspection of frames 
between body station (BS) 360 and 
BS 907 to determine if certain 
support brackets of the air 
conditioning (A/C) outlet 
extrusions are installed; medium- 
and high-frequency eddy current 
inspections for cracking of the 
frames around the attachment 
holes of the subject brackets; and 
repair if necessary. 
C 2/27/2009  $        46,216,954  1% 
1Affected modes are defined as: C = Commercial, A = Air Taxi, G = General 
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Table B-1. Continued 
Document 
ID Summary 
Mode(s) 
Affected1 
Effective 
Date 
 Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years  
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FAA-2001-
8725-0003 
This final rule amends the existing 
airplane operator security rule to 
include security requirement for 
additional types of operators 
related to terrorism and hazardous 
material threats. 
C,A 11/14/2001  $        40,000,000  1% 
FAA-2001-
10428-0020 
This action amends the flight data 
recorder regulations by expanding 
the recording specifications of 
certain data parameters for 
specified airplanes, and by adding 
aircraft models to the lists of 
aircraft excepted from the 1997 
regulations. 
C 7/18/2003  $        38,000,000  1% 
All Other 
Regulations        $      856,399,342  11% 
Total        $   7,553,710,740    
1Affected modes are defined as: C = Commercial, A = Air Taxi, G = General 
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Table B-2. Significant NHTSA Regulations 
Document 
ID Description 
Mode 
Affected 
Effective 
Date 
Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years 
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency Cost 
NHTSA-
2009-0093-
0001 
As part of a comprehensive plan 
for reducing the risk of rollover 
crashes and the risk of death and 
serious injury in those crashes, this 
final rule upgrades the agency's 
safety standard on roof crush 
resistance in several ways. 
P 7/13/2009  $  14,883,700,000  25% 
NHTSA-
2005-
20586-0001  
This final rule establishes a new 
Federal motor vehicle safety 
standard (FMVSS) requiring 
installation of a tire pressure 
monitoring system (TPMS) capable 
of detecting when one or more of a 
vehicle's tires is significantly 
under-inflated. 
P,T,B 4/8/2005  $  13,899,600,000  23% 
NHTSA-
2007-
27662-
0001-0001  
As part of a comprehensive plan 
for reducing the serious risk of 
rollover crashes and the risk of 
death and serious injury in those 
crashes, this document establishes 
a new Federal motor vehicle safety 
standard (FMVSS) No. 126 to 
require electronic stability control 
(ESC) systems on passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, 
trucks, and buses with a gross 
vehicle weight rating of 4,536 Kg 
(10,000 pounds) or less. 
P,T,B 6/5/2007  $  10,835,000,000  18% 
NHTSA-
2000-8572-
0219-0001  
The first response to the TREAD 
act. It establishes a new Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that 
requires the installation of tire 
pressure monitoring systems 
(TPMSs) that warn the driver when 
a tire is significantly under-
inflated. The standard applies to 
passenger cars, trucks, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, 
and buses with a gross vehicle 
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or 
less, except those vehicles with 
dual wheels on an axle 
P,T,B 8/5/2002  $     8,966,200,000  15% 
2Affected modes are defined as: P = Private Auto, T = Commercial Truck, B = Bus 
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Table B-2. Continued 
Document 
ID Description 
Mode 
Affected 
Effective 
Date 
Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years 
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency Cost 
NHTSA-
2007-
29134-0005 
This final rule incorporates a 
dynamic pole test into Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
(FMVSS) No. 214, Side impact 
protection.' To meet the test, 
vehicle manufacturers will need to 
assure head and improved chest 
protection in side crashes. 
P 11/13/2007  $     6,160,000,000  10% 
NHTSA-
2005-
23439-0001  
In 6/2003, NHTSA published a 
final rule establishing upgraded tire 
performance requirements for new 
tires for use on vehicles with a 
gross vehicle weight rating of 
10,000 pounds or less. We are 
amending the performance 
requirements for snow tires used on 
light vehicles. 
P 6/1/2007  $     1,199,000,000  2% 
NHTSA-
2004-
19807-0002 
This final rule upgrades NHTSA's 
head restraint standard in order to 
reduce whiplash injuries in rear 
collisions. For front seats, the rule 
establishes a higher minimum 
height requirement, a requirement 
limiting the distance between the 
back of an occupant's head and the 
occupant's head restraint, as well as 
a limit on the size of gaps and 
openings within head restraints. 
P 3/14/2005  $        985,140,000  2% 
All Other 
Regulations       
 $     
3,160,905,325  5% 
Total        $  60,089,545,325    
2Affected modes are defined as: P = Private Auto, T = Commercial Truck, B = Bus 
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Table B-3. Significant FMCSA Regulations 
Document 
ID Description 
Mode 
Affected3 
Effective 
Date 
Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years 
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency Cost 
FMCSA-
1997-2350-
23305 
Increased requirements for 
commercial vehicle driver rest and 
drive time limits 
T 6/27/2003  $ 16,250,000,000  89% 
FMCSA-
2001-
11061-0055 
Improves requirements for safety 
audit of new commercial vehicle 
carriers 
T,B 2/17/2009  $     510,390,000  3% 
FMCSA-
2001-9709-
0786 
Updated requirements and 
penalties for commercial driver 
license holders related to non-
commercial vehicle offences or 
convictions 
T,B 1/29/2003  $     466,250,000  3% 
FMCSA-
2000-7017-
0028 
Subjects commercial passenger 
transport (9-15 passengers) to same 
safety requirements as 
motorcoaches 
B 9/11/2003  $     213,000,000  1% 
FMCSA-
1997-2210-
0209 
Updates medical certification 
requirements for obtaining a 
commercial driver’s license 
T,B 1/30/2009  $     199,020,000  1% 
FMCSA-
1997-2199-
0218 
Updates training requirements for 
obtaining a commercial driver’s 
license 
T,B 7/20/2004  $     146,410,000  1% 
FMCSA-
1997-2277-
0093 
Updated rules and requirements for 
obtaining prior safety records of 
prospective commercial driver’s 
license holders 
T,B 4/29/2004  $     136,730,000  1% 
FMCSA-
2002-
13015-0023 
Allows for better enforcement of 
existing rules to prevent motor 
carriers from operating outside 
their prescribed authority 
T,B 9/27/2006  $     108,300,000  1% 
All Other 
Regulations        $     206,738,750  1% 
Total        $ 18,236,838,750    
3Affected modes are defined as: T = Commercial Truck, B = Bus 
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